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Abstract 
This study assesses the effects of industrial disputes legislation and the dispute settlement 
process on informal versus formal employment in India. It uses indicators of pro-worker court 
awards and court efficiency as well as amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) at the 
level of Indian states. The state-level IDA amendments are classified as pro-worker or pro-
employer and enforcement enhancing. Three complementary empirical approaches and data 
sources  are  used.  These  include  a  quasi-panel  dataset  constructed  from  four  household 
employment  surveys  (NSSO)  between  1983-1999,  a  state-industry  level  panel  dataset  for 
organised (formal) sector industrial units (ASI) for 1980-1997 and a cross-sectional survey of 
unorganised (informal) manufacturing firms for 2000/2001.  
 
The  significance  of  the  judicial  indicators  varies  by  indicator  and  the  magnitude  of 
relationship with formal employment remains rather small. The evidence is neither robust, nor 
consistent, enough to confirm that pro-worker judicial change would be related to a lower 
degree of formal work in the entire service or industrial sectors. However, pro-worker judicial 
change and judicial efficiency can be linked more consistently to a formalisation of work 
within the organised industrial sector. More efficient courts are also associated with a lower 
tendency of unorganised firms to produce for a sub-contractor. Finally, education, personal 
attributes and social status are found to be significant correlates of employment type, which 
implies that policies aiming to raise formality should also focus on such factors.   
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1 INTRODUCTION     
 
Legal protection for formal sector workers in India is considered strict, and the 
existing laws have been criticised for impeding industrial growth and formal 
sector employment generation. In the 1980s, when deregulation of industries 
and trade began, output growth in the formal manufacturing sector accelerated, 
but employment growth appeared to come to a halt. This combination sparked a 
discussion  about  “jobless  growth”.  Some  blamed  the  increases  in  legal 
protection for labour, others rising wages and increases in working hours (see 
e.g.  Fallon  and  Lucas,  1993,  Bhalotra,  1998  and  Nagaraj,  2003).  The 
government  recently  enacted  a  Rural  Employment  Guarantee  Act  (2005)  in 
recognition of a need to provide adequate employment and social security.  
 
This paper addresses the debate by analysing whether labour regulation and the 
industrial disputes climate contribute to the persistence of an informal-formal 
employment  divide  in  India.  It  assesses  the  relationships  between  dispute 
settlement and related labour regulation (Industrial Dispute Act) and formal-
informal sector employment from several perspectives. 
 
Indian  labour  regulation  consists  of  several  central  acts,  which  have  been 
amended  by  states  over  time  as  well  as  some  state-specific  acts.  A  key 
determinant of applicability of different labour laws is the number of employees 
in a firm. This threshold varies by Act and Sections of different Acts. With very 
few  exceptions  most  labour  acts  in  India  apply,  or  are  relevant  only  to  the 
organised sector.  
 
The  majority  of  non-agricultural  workforce  does  not  work  in  the  organised 
sector  defined  either  by  maintenance  of  regular  accounts  or  applicability  of 
labour and social protection. Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2003) estimate that in 
the  year  2000-01,  the  unorganised  sector  contributed  to  82%  of  total 
manufacturing  employment.  At  a  general  level,  the  distinction  between  the 
unorganised  and  organised  sector  is  possibly  clearest  in  the  case  of 
manufacturing and mining. In Indian official statistics, all units in these sectors 
with  power  employing  more  than  10  workers,  and  those  without  power, 
employing  more  than  20  workers,  are  classified  as  organised  and  should 
maintain regular accounts on activity and employment.
1 Such units also fulfil 
the definition of a “factory” as defined in the “Factories Act” and are expected 
to  comply  with  the  core  of  nation  and  state-wide  labour  and  industrial 
legislation.  
  
  2 
The Industrial Disputes Act (IDA), a central piece of legislation, is important 
from the perspective of job security and the rights of workers concerning labour 
disputes. Since a 1982 job security amendment to IDA that came into force in 
1984,  industrial  firms  with  more  than  100  permanent  workers  have  been 
required to apply for state government permission concerning the lay-off or 
retrenchment of a permanent worker or the closure of the firm.
2 It is generally 
perceived that such laws leave firms with too little flexibility, which could deter 
formal sector employment growth, and that the laws should be modernised (see 
e.g.  CII,  2004).  On  the  other  hand,  the  majority of  workers  remain  without 
adequate social or labour protection.  
 
Although  protection  for  formal  workers  may  appear  strict  on  paper, 
enforcement and implementation can be a different matter. The central IDA was 
amended individually by Indian states until the late 1980s after which, little has 
changed  on  paper.  Despite  lack  of  formal  change,  it  is  perceived  that  the 
application  of  labour  laws  has  changed,  especially  in  response  to  the 
liberalisation wave in the 1990s (see e.g. Nagaraj, 2007).
3 Figures on strikes and 
lockouts (see e.g. Sen, 2003 and Jyoti and Sidhu, 2003) suggest that employers 
have steadily gained more power. An increase in the number of lockouts on the 
part of employers has been accompanied with a fall in the number of strikes, 
especially  in  the  1990s.  Additionally,  many  industrial  disputes  are  left  un-
resolved by the legal system due to the inefficiency of the Indian legal system. 
In May 2000, there were 533,038 cases pending in the Indian Labour Courts, 
out of which 28,864 had been pending for over 10 years (Sivananthiran and 
Ratnam, 2003). 
 
The  settlement  of  industrial  disputes  and  the  enforcement  of  labour  and 
industrial legislation fall under state government jurisdiction, with the exception 
of some industries. Thus, the functioning of the industrial relations mechanism 
and enforcement can depend on government attitudes and political orientation. 
It is the responsibility of the state government to arrange for conciliation of a 
dispute  and  if  such  fails,  with  the  exception  of  certain  states,  only  the 
government can refer the dispute to a state Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal.  
 
Existing studies on the effects of IDA in India have focused on the productivity 
of firms and employment in the organised sector (see e.g. Hasan et al., 2007, 
and Besley and Burgess, 2004) and mostly statutory change. The arguments 
above  suggest  that  it  should  also  be  of  interest  to  assess  whether  labour 
legislation  matters  for  the  unorganised-organised  (formal-informal) 
employment divide. For instance, if a firm has the option to hire workers not 
protected by job security provisions, it could gradually shift to such without  
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necessarily becoming less productive or losing employees. They also suggest 
that it would also be important to examine the court process in practice. 
 
The  focus  of  this  paper  is  on  the  functioning  of  the  dispute  settlement 
mechanism and changes to IDA at the level of Indian states. Indicators on court 
efficiency and the share of pro-worker awards in the dispute settlement process 
are  constructed  for  each  Indian  state  for  the  period  1979-1999.  State  level 
amendments to the IDA  are  coded either as those that  aim to facilitate  and 
strengthen the dispute settlement process and strengthen the implementation of 
awards, or those that raise the protection of workers or employers. In a study on 
the  effects  of  Indian  labour  regulation,  Besley  and  Burgess  (2004)  have 
previously  classified  state-level  amendments  to  IDA  as  pro-worker  or  pro-
employer, but this paper proposes a modified classification. It is acknowledged 
that results can be sensitive to the chosen categorisation and the form in which 
these variables enter the regression. Thus, the indicators of the judicial process 
in practice are a valuable addition.  
 
There are several channels via which the judicial process captured by the above 
indicators can affect the degree of informality. Since only permanent workers in 
organised firms are covered by job security provisions in IDA, temporary, or 
contract  workforce,  provides  a  means  of  circumventing  these  provisions. 
Bhandari  and  Heshmati  (2006)  show  that  the  share  of  temporary,  contract 
workers  in  Indian  manufacturing  industry,  excluding  managerial  and 
administrative workers, has doubled over the period 1992-2001. Sasikumar and 
Sharma  (1996)  also  claim  that  employment  expansion  in  the  manufacturing 
sector  in  the  early  1990s  happened  mostly  via  the  use  of  non-permanent 
workforce.  
 
Additionally, pro-worker judicial changes could affect the tendency of firms to 
shift some of their production or sub-contract work to smaller units that are not 
covered  as  strictly  by  various  labour  laws.  More  generally,  changes  in  the 
judicial indicators could also deter both small and large firm expansion plans 
and thus the growth of formal employment. 
 
The relationship between informal work and efficient labour courts, or legal 
change aiming to improve enforcement and efficiency, is a priori unclear. Such 
change can encourage firm expansion and the hiring of formal workers, but 
could potentially also be seen as a further impediment. If law enforcement is 
perceived as lax and dispute cases left unsolved by the judiciary, labour laws 
are less likely to pose a significant impediment to firm recruitment practices or 
productive  decisions.  On  the  other  hand,  higher  court  efficiency,  better  
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enforcement  and  speedier  dispute  settlement  may  encourage  expansion  of 
salaried and regular or organised sector work. 
 
The analysis in this paper is carried out in three steps. The first and primary 
question examined is: do regulation and the court process affect the share of 
formal (regular) workers in industry and services overall? The employment data 
used  come  from  four  national,  cross-sectional,  household  employment-
unemployment surveys with individual-level information, over the period 1983-
1999. These are used to construct a quasi-panel dataset. In the absence of more 
detail,  regular  salaried  workers  are  used  to  proxy  for  formal  workers.  A 
justification  is  provided.  This  analysis  is  complemented  with  a  brief 
examination  of  organised  and  unorganised  sector  links.  Firstly,  the  relation 
between the judicial indicators and social security coverage in the organised 
manufacturing  sector  is  examined.  For  this  purpose,  an  industry-state  level, 
annual panel dataset for the period 1980-1997 is used. It is argued that within 
industry changes in the relation of employers’ social security contributions to 
the total wage bill can function as a proxy indicator for the degree of work 
carried out by temporary, contract workers. Secondly, the study examines the 
connection between the judicial indicators and the prevalence of sub-contracting 
production to the unorganised sector. This part utilises a national survey on 
small, unorganised sector manufacturing firms for 2000-01.   
 
The results show that the significance of judicial indicators varies by estimated 
model and the magnitude of relationship with formal employment can be small. 
One of the conclusions of the analysis is that the hypothesis of a clear negative 
link between formal employment and pro-worker judicial change does not hold. 
The results of the first analysis on regular versus irregular work are not robust to 
specification or indicator, and a strong relationship between judicial change and 
an economy-wide formal-informal employment divide in the case of the service 
or industrial sectors cannot be confirmed.  
 
However, judicial change, both increased pro-worker orientation and efficiency, 
can be linked more consistently to formalisation of work within the organised 
industrial sector. Thus, intuitively, the influence of judicial change is clearest for 
sectors and workers directly affected and covered by IDA and other labour laws. 
Additionally,  cross-sectional  results  show  that  more  efficient  courts  can  be 
associated  with  a  lower  tendency  of  unorganised  firms  to  engage  in  a  sub-
contracting arrangement. Finally, an additional cross-sectional analysis reveals 
that education, personal attributes and social status are significant correlates of 
employment type. Although legal factors, such as court efficiency, can play a  
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part, the results imply that policies aiming to raise formal employment should 
also target social inequalities.  
 
The  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  2  reviews  briefly  some  of  the 
existing relevant literature. Section 3 describes Indian labour laws, the dispute 
settlement process and presents data on the labour regulation indicators and 
associated hypotheses. Section 4 focuses on the analysis of the employment 
survey data and Section 5 complements the analysis with a focus on organised 




Dual labour markets have interested economists for long, starting with the work 
of Lewis (1954). The topic of informality has however re-emerged with data 
developments  and  the  literature  on  the  effects  of  labour  protection  on 
employment. With recent trade liberalisation episodes in developing countries, 
studies have also started to examine how labour regulation affects the capacity 
of firms to adjust when faced with competitive pressure arising from economic 
liberalisation.  This  Section  describes  briefly  some  of  the  existing  empirical 
research that is relevant from the perspective of this study.  
 
In a study on the effects of state-level amendments to the Industrial Disputes 
Act  (IDA)  in  India  over  the  period  1958-1992,  Besley  and  Burgess  (2004) 
speculate  that  a  higher  degree  of  worker  protection  should  affect  firm 
productivity or output via a price-effect or an expropriation effect. The first 
refers to adjustment costs in the hiring and firing of labour. If these are high due 
to more pro-worker regulation, firms may substitute capital for labour. Labour 
regulation may also discourage firms currently not subject to regulations from 
expanding. The second refers to the worker’s capacity to extract their share of 
returns to investment. If labour protection raises this, it may lower the desire of 
firms to invest and impede growth. With state-industry level panel data, the 
authors find that pro-worker amendments to IDA have had a negative impact on 
productivity, output and employment in the organised manufacturing sector, and 
led to a substitution of labour by capital. With aggregate state-level data, they 
also show that pro-worker changes in regulation have raised the level of output 
in unorganised manufacturing and lowered it in organised manufacturing.  
 
The Besley and Burgess regulation measure has been used in other studies on 
India and also subjected to critique (see e.g. Bhattacharjea, 2006 for latter). 
Using  this  indicator,  together  with  data  on  strikes  and  lockouts,  Sanyal  and 
Menon  (2005)  find  that  firm  location  choice  is  affected  negatively  by  the  
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number of Labour Courts, unions on register and days lost to industrial dispute 
activity in the state. A further study (Aghion et al., 2006), using the same labour 
protection measure as Besley and Burgess (2004) finds that the deregulation of 
industries  that  took  place  over  the  1980s  and  1990s  in  India  led  to  better 
performance of industries that were located in states that had enacted more pro-
employer  amendments  to  the  IDA.  Hasan  et  al.  (2004)  find  that  trade 
liberalisation raises the elasticity of labour demand in the organised sector more 
in states that have more pro-employer regulation. They have made a slight ad 
hoc modification to the Besley-Burgess index. In a recent study, Amin (2006) 
uses a World Bank enterprise dataset of retail businesses in India and finds that 
labour  regulation  affects  the  substitution  of  labour  by  technology  such  as 
computers. 
 
There are fewer, but a growing number of studies on the effects of labour laws 
that  focus  on  the  informal  and  formal  sector  divide  or  the  effects  of  law 
enforcement. In a survey on Latin American countries, Heckman and Pages 
(2003)  find  that  job  security  provisions  reduce  the  demand  for  labour  for 
younger  workers,  exacerbate  the  formal-informal  sector  divide  and  raise 
inequality. In a study on Colombia and Brazil, Pavcnik and Goldberg (2003) 
show that in Colombia trade liberalisation was accompanied with a rise in the 
firm’s  tendency  to  employ  informal  workers,  but  only  prior  to  regulatory 
changes that increased labour market flexibility. Kugler (2004) finds evidence 
of an increase in job turnover of formal workers covered by labour protection in 
relation  to  turnover  of  informal  workers  after  a  relaxation  of  job  security 
provisions  in  Colombia.  Almeida  and  Carneiro  (2006)  assess  the  effects  of 
labour  regulation  on  informality  with  cross-sectional,  firm-level  dataset  for 
Brazil  by  focusing  on  law  enforcement  that  varies  by  cities.  Their  results 
suggest that stricter enforcement lowers the share of informal workers, but also 
lowers productivity and wages.  
 
This  study  on  India  focuses  on  the  efficiency  and  outcomes  of  the  dispute 
settlement  process  rather  than  simply  the  flexibility  offered  by  law  to  the 
employer.  The  effects  of  law  enforcement  at  the  micro-level  in  India  have 
previously  been  studied  for  instance  by  Chemin  (2004).  He  uses  a  cross-
sectional dataset and focuses on High Court efficiency in general and among 
other things, it’s the effects on unorganised firm finance, and sub-contracting. 
Although, the focus is different, the third part of the analysis in this study on 
contract work in unorganised firms bears some resemblance to the empirical 
work by Chemin. 
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A more general aspect on informality is raised for instance by Maloney (2004). 
He emphasises that the fact that informal sector employment is a choice for 
some is often neglected, and it cannot be taken for granted that informal sector 
workers  are  necessarily  worse  off  than  formal  ones.  The  heterogeneity  of 
informal workers also implies that the organised and unorganised sectors do not 
simply operate as two entirely separate sectors, but that links can exist between 
the two. This motivates the additional analysis on sub-contracting activity in 
this paper.  
 
 
3  INDIAN  LABOUR  LAWS  AND  INDUSTRIAL  RELATIONS 
CLIMATE 
 
3.1 LABOUR LAWS 
 
The Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (IDA) is one of the central labour acts and is 
common to all states. It sets out the guidelines for conciliation, arbitration and 
abjudication in the case of an industrial dispute. Employees covered by IDA are 
workmen. This includes most employees with the main exception being those 
whose  main  duty  is  of  a  managerial,  supervisory  or  administrative  capacity 
(Section 2s). The IDA (Section 2k) defines an industrial dispute as “any dispute 
or  difference  between  employers  and  employers,  or  between  employers  and 
workmen,  or  between  workmen  and  workmen,  which  is  connected  with  the 
employment  or  non-employment  or  the  terms  of  employment  or  with  the 
conditions of labour, of any person”.  
 
One  of  the  main  purposes  of  IDA  is  to  define  the  procedures  for  dispute 
settlement and the authorities involved. It also includes provisions on the layoff 
and  retrenchment  of  workers  and  associated  compensation  and  specifies 
employer’s  duties  in  the  case  of  changes  in  service  conditions.  It  regulates 
strikes and lockouts and restricts them especially in public utility services
4 and 
during  pendency  of  conciliation  or  arbitration  of  a  dispute.  It  also  lists 
conditions required for closure of establishments and prohibits “unfair” work 
practices. Additionally, it defines the penalties involved.  
 
This study focuses on the IDA, because it is a central act to consider for the 
debate on the effects of labour law on hiring practices and expansionary activity 
of firms. There have been some central level amendments to IDA during the 
1980s and 1990s, but states have themselves amended it more frequently during 
this period than other key central labour acts, which have seen little state level 
amendments since the early 1980s.  
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A controversial central amendment in 1982 (came into force in 1984) extended 
the coverage of Chapter V-B of IDA from industrial establishments employing 
over 300 to those employing over 100 workers. Chapter V-B applies only to 
manufacturing and mining units and plantations and not to service sector units. 
It  does  not  apply  to  establishments  of  “a  seasonal  character”  and  only  to 
workers “who have been in continuous service for not less than one year“. Thus, 
it is not applicable to temporary, contract workers, which is why it is argued 
that larger firms may circumvent it by employing more contract workers, who 
are typically temporary or short-term workers. Chapter V-B specifies that in 
units with more than 100 workers  
 
“on an average day no worker whose name is on the muster roll (wage register) 
can be laid off without prior permission from the appropriate government or 
authority,  unless  the  layoff  is  due  to  a  shortage  of  power  or  to  natural 
calamity”.  
 
Permission  for  similar  establishments  is  required  also  for  retrenchment  of 
workers and closure of the establishment.
5 Some provisions on general notice 
periods for retrenchment and layoff apply to all workers.
6  Those on entitlement 
to  compensation  for  layoff  and  firm  closure  apply  further  to  non-seasonal 
industrial (not service) establishments with more than 50 workers (Chapter V-
A), when the workman “has been in continuous service for not less than one 
year”.  
 
As listed in IDA Schedule 2, Labour Courts have jurisdiction over matters such 
as standing orders, discharge and dismissal of workers, and illegality of strikes 
and lockouts. In addition to matters within the jurisdiction of a Labour Court, 
Industrial Tribunals can also abjudicate on matters under Schedule 3 of IDA 
(e.g.  hours  of  work,  wages,  leave  with  pay,  retrenchment  and  closure  of 
establishment, bonus and provident fund).  
 
Since items up for dispute extend beyond those covered in IDA, it is worth 
mentioning a few other general labour acts. Individual employment contracts, 
employment conditions and employer-employee relations are regulated by the 
Industrial  Employment  (Standing  Orders)  Act  (1946),  which  covers  all 
industrial units (excludes several services) with more than 100 workers. The 
Factories  Act  (1948)  aims  to  protect  the  health  and  safety  of  workers,  and 
applies to all units with more than 10 workers or 20 workers if electricity is not 
used. The Minimum Wages Act covers in theory anyone working in India and 
state governments have the right to fix and change the level of minimum wages.  
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The two important welfare acts are the Employees’ State Insurance Act (1948) 
and  the  Employees’  Provident  Fund  Act  (1952).  The  former  applies  to  all 
“factories” (above ten workers with power) in the first case and latter to any 
establishment with over 20 workers. The first concerns employee benefits in the 
case of sickness, maternity or injury, and the second relates to pensions.  
 
Although disputes can be raised under IDA in several areas, these aspects rarely 
apply to unorganised sector workers (job security, leave pay, standing orders, 
provident fund, bonus etc.) and procedural formalities prevent the raising of 
disputes in the unorganised sector (see e.g. Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2002). 
As these authors note, the majority of unpaid household work is not yet even 
recognised as employment. Although the IDA would apply in general to most 
service sector activities, not all of these would be covered by other Acts. Thus, 
general applicability of the IDA may still remain a matter of interpretation in 
the case of some service and trade activities.
7  
 
The  Contract  Labour  Act  (1970)  regulates  the  use  of  temporary,  contract 
workers and applies to all units employing more than 20 contract workers over 
the  past  year  or  a  contractor  employing  more  than  20  workers,  but  not  to 
establishments where work overall is of a casual or seasonal nature.
8 Contract 
workers are in theory entitled to similar benefits in terms  of social security 
(provident fund and employees’ state insurance) than permanent workers. They 
are also entitled to similar wages, but evidence and observations suggest that 
this can be far from the case (see e.g. Bhandari and Heshmati, 2006).  
 
3.2 DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
 
Depending on the industry involved, the appropriate government for dealing 
with an industrial dispute is either the central or the state government (see e.g. 
Sen, 2003 for a detailed description).
9 The state government plays a decisive 
role, since, with the exception of a few states, only the government can refer a 
dispute for abjudication. The conciliation process, which is often the first step in 
dispute  resolution,  involves  a  third  party  in  the  form  of  a  government 
conciliation officer or a board. The government should react to a dispute either 
in receipt of an application from the parties of the dispute or in the case of 
industries in the “public interest” immediately upon notification of a dispute. 
The process of conciliation may be circumvented if the worker or employer can 
apply  directly  for  abjudication  in  court.  This  is  possible  in  Tamil  Nadu, 
Karnataka and West Bengal
10; in the last two only since late 1980s. Based on 
various  studies,  Sen  (2003)  concludes  that  the  conciliation  or  adjudication  
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machinery has failed to handle a large share of disputes in India; in late 1980s 
more than 50% of disputes were settled bilaterally or lapsed.  
 
Figure 1 describes the dispute settlement process in the case that the individual 
parties  do  not  apply  for  abjudication  themselves.  If  the  conciliation  process 
fails, a failure of conciliation (FOC) report will be submitted to the appropriate 
government. The process of compulsory abjudication entails that all failed cases 
should in principle be referred to a Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal without 
delay.  However,  there  are  claims  that  in  practice  the  government  has  not 
referred cases to abjudication on merit grounds despite this decision not being 
strictly in its domain (see Ghose in Sivananthiran and Ratnam, 2003) and that 
the process of referral can be extremely slow.  
 
Figure 1 SETTLEMENT OF LABOUR DISPUTES 
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The regional and national Labour Courts and Tribunals are lower courts. The 
awards  of  Labour  Courts  and  Industrial  Tribunals  are  binding,  and  non-
implementation  is  punishable  under  IDA  Section  29  with  a  fine  and 
imprisonment. However, labour Courts do not have the power to issue a decree 
for the implementation (see Shenoy in Sivananthiran and Ratnam, 2003). The 
awards may be contested in High Court or in the Supreme Court (see e.g. Sen, 
2003). The exceptions are the states of Bihar and West Bengal, which have 
amended the IDA. Shenoy (as above) claims that awards have been challenged 
in High Court by employers, despite prosecution for non-implementation, and 
that  in  2003,  there  were  2500  unimplemented  awards  alone  in  the  Central 
government  sphere  that  concerned  20000  workers.  Workers  often  have 
inadequate  resources  to  defend  their  cases  in  High  Court,  and  this  lack  of 
resources is likely to give employers bargaining power over implementation. 
High court decisions come with considerable delays.
11 
 
3.3  INDICATORS  FOR  LABOUR  LAW  AND  INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS CLIMATE 
 
Due to the problems with implementation and possible political influence over 
the abjudication process, statutory legal change may only offer a partial picture 
of the legal framework behind industrial relations. Thus, the analysis in this 
paper is complemented with two indicators of dispute settlement in practice. 
This Section looks at the state level developments in the industrial disputes 
climate, dispute settlement and related regulation in India over the period 1979-
1999 for which data can be obtained from available statistical sources.
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Two  main  indicators  are  used  to  portray  the  functioning  of  the  industrial 
disputes settlement mechanism at the state level:  
 
•  Court efficiency: The ratio of the number of court awards in a year to the 
number of disputes abjudicated in the same year and  
•  Pro-worker  share:  The  share  of  pro-worker  awards  out  of  total  court 
(Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal) awards that year.  
 
Time series data for the entire period on the number of cases pending in state 
Labour Courts are not readily available. The above-mentioned court efficiency 
variable is used as an alternative indicator. The correlation coefficient between 
the average value of this indicator for period 1997-1999 (not available for 2000) 
and that for the number of cases pending in state Labour Courts per population 
in year 2000 is -0.41. This is not negligible. The higher the court efficiency 
indicator, the lower is the number of cases pending in state Labour Courts.  The  
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share of pro-worker awards is used as an indicator of judicial outcomes, or bias, 
in practice.  
 
In addition to the two indicators, Table 1 shows the average values per state for 
the  period  1979-1999  for  the  number  of  disputes  that  enter  the  industrial 
relations machinery in a year and the number of disputes abjudicated that year. 
The disputes that are referred for abjudication do not necessarily relate to those 
that enter the industrial relations machinery that year, but can also relate to 
previous disputes handled with a delay. It might be possible to construct other 
indicators of the legal process as well as the two mentioned above, but problems 
with  interpretation  can  arise.  For  instance,  the  ratio  of  disputes  referred  to 
abjudication  in  the  first  place  could  be  of  interest,  but  a  lower  ratio  could 
simultaneously  reflect  lax  enforcement  on  the  government’s  part,  a  better 
functioning conciliation mechanism or differences in the nature of the disputes. 
 
 
TABLE 1 STATE-LEVEL INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES AND LEGAL INDICATORS: 1979-1999  
 
Mandays lost 















STATE  MEAN  OBS  MEAN OBS  MEAN  OBS  MEAN  OBS  MEAN  OBS  MEAN  OBS 
Andhra Pradesh  1.2  18  908  4  242  4  988  4  0.75  4  2.74  4 
Assam  0.3  18  401  8  101  10  39  9  0.55  9  0.39  10 
Bihar  1.1  18  682  4  126  4  97  4  0.66  4  1.88  4 
Chandigarh  0.1  14  370  15  234  15  213  15  0.51  15  1.16  15 
Delhi  0.8  16  7934  18  3969  18  711  18  0.59  18  0.19  18 
Goa  2.1  18  329  15  58  15  32  14  0.57  13  0.50  14 
Gujarat  0.5  18  4948  10  8329  10  4438  10  0.65  10  0.56  10 
Haryana  0.9  18  4949  16  1619  16  835  16  0.47  15  0.62  16 
Himachal Pradesh  0.5  17  278  12  71  12  92.8  12  0.64  12  1.70  11 
Karnataka  1.0  18  2121  13  1095  13  642  13  0.71  13  0.79  13 
Kerala  2.5  18  6382  15  477  15  320  15  0.68  15  0.73  15 
Madhya Pradesh  0.2  18  656  7  310  7  79  4  0.86  3  0.24  4 
Maharashtra  2.4  18  6022  13  2327  12  1599  13  0.46  13  0.70  12 
Orissa  0.5  18  923  17  187  17  221  17  0.62  17  1.25  17 
Punjab  0.6  18  8252  17  3592  17  2784  17  0.61  17  0.82  17 
Rajasthan  1.4  18  2519  20  1454  20  827  13  0.63  13  0.60  13 
Tamil Nadu  1.4  18  9308  17  1172  17  552  13  0.64  13  0.70  13 
Uttar Pradesh  0.6  18  6920  3  3480  4  1728  4  0.58  4  0.55  4 
West Bengal    0  7148  2  2124  2    0    0    0 
Sources: Various issues of Indian Labour Statistics, Pocket Book of Labour Statistics and Indian Labour Year Book, Labour Bureau, 
Government of India, Shimla. Goa includes Daman and Diu up to the year 1988. All observations, including outlier values are 
included, which raises average levels in certain cases, e.g. court efficiency and abjudicated disputes. If the values are restricted 
between 0 and 1, the average value for court efficiency is 0.48. Most small states and Union territories are excluded, since they tend to 
have either no or very few dispute cases. Jammu and Kashmir is excluded due to lack of data. West Bengal also has inadequate data, 
but has amended the IDA actively (see Table 2). IRM = Industrial relations machinery. Court efficiency = ratio of number of awards 
to number of disputes abjudicated in the year, Pro-worker share = share of pro-worker awards out of all awards within a year. Workers 
in column 2 refer to organised sector (ASI) manufacturing workers.   
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Data  quality  is  better  for  some  states  than  others,  since  in  some  cases,  the 
number of missing observations is too large for the state to be included in the 
analysis.  Due  to  the  presence  of  occasional  missing  observations  and  some 
outliers in the indicators on court efficiency and pro-worker awards, two parts 
of the analysis in this paper rely on three-year averages of these indicators, for 
the current and past two years. Another argument for using averages is that 
reactions to changes in the quality of dispute settlement are likely to come with 
a lag and perceptions to be built up over a course of recent years, not simply on 
the  basis  of  the  latest  year.  More  on  this  matter  follows  in  the  Section  on 
regression analysis. 
 
Since time-series indicators on the dispute settlement process are missing for 
several  states  and  it  may  be  of  interest  to  control  for  statutory  change 
simultaneously, state amendments to the central IDA are also analysed. The 
central IDA is the benchmark and the amendments considered are deviations by 
states from the benchmark. Besley and Burgess (2004) have already coded state 
amendments  to  IDA  as  pro-worker  or  pro-employer.  Bhattacharjea  (2006) 
provides  a  critique  of  their  approach.  The  way  the  state  level  statutory 
amendments are classified remains inevitably a matter on interpretation, but this 
paper proposes one alternative. It still resembles the one by Besley and Burgess 
to an extent. Ahsan and Pages have also offered an alternative reclassification.
13  
 
The  decision  on  classification  was  guided  by  the  nature  of  the  state  level 
amendments and the concerns with a lack of enforcement and inefficiency of 
the dispute settlement mechanism. From this perspective, it seems appropriate 
to  divide  the  amendments  into  those  that  facilitate  the  dispute  settlement 
process,  grant  more  power  to  Labour  Courts  and  aim  to  improve  the 
implementation  of  awards  (“enforcement  acts”)  and  those  that  aim  to  raise 
protection  for  workers  against  that  of  employers  (“pro-worker  acts”).  Only 
those amendments that can be assigned to either category are considered here. 
Some  of  the  amendments  assigned  to  the  two  categories  overlap.  There  are 
several amendments for which the bias or interpretation is not clear, and these 
are not included in the analysis. Thus, not all of the amendments included in the 
Besley-Burgess index are included here. Several of the amendments classified 
as  enforcement  amendments  here  were  classified  as  pro-employer  ones  by 
Besley and Burgess.  
 
The amendments included in either category are listed in Annex 1. It shows 
state amendments since the enactment of IDA (1947), although the regression 
analysis  will  only  consider  changes  since  the  1980s.  An  example  of  an 
“enforcement act” would be an amendment that allow for individual workers or  
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employers  to  apply  directly  to  the  Labour  Court  for  abjudication,  or  an 
amendment that raises the punishment for non-implementation of awards. Only 
one amendment in West Bengal (1980) is such that it can be considered as 
posing a further impediment to the process. Others aim to improve the process. 
A  pro-worker  amendment  would  for  instance  be  one  that  strengthens  the 
workers  rights  in  relation  to  closure  of  an  undertaking  or  retrenchment  and 
layoff and appropriate payment. A pro-employer amendment would for instance 
be one that while strengthening the legal process, is likely to impose larger 
barriers to the worker relative to the employer, such as a rise in the cost of 
dispute settlement.  
 
A similar approach to that in Besley and Burgess (2004) is used to assign values 
for the changes to IDA; a value of 1 is assigned to an amendment that facilitates 
the process and a –1 to one that complicates it, and a similar strategy is used for 
pro-worker  (1)  and  pro-employer  amendments  (-1).  The  final  indicator  is 
cumulative over time. Given the way in which the indicators are constructed, 
the emphasis shall be on the change, not the level. One evident critique of the 
approach is that not all of the changes will be of similar importance. Secondly, 
results  can  be  sensitive  to  the  chosen  categorisation  of  each  amendment. 
Thirdly,  there  is  relatively  little  time  variation  in  these  indicators.  No 
amendments  took  place  in  the  1990s,  and  over  the  period  1980-2000 
amendments  often  cluster  around  a  certain  year  in  each  state.  Thus,  the 
novelties of this paper relate to the indicators on the judicial process in practice. 
 
Average values for the cumulative index for state-level amendments to IDA 
(coded as above) are shown for the period 1979-1999 in Table 2. This is also 
the period for which data on the settlement of disputes can be obtained. One 
amendment that is not in the central IDA, but that according to Bhattacharjea 
(2006)  is  directly  relevant  for  the  dispute  settlement  process  is  the  1983 
amendment to Uttar Pradesh IDA (see Annex 1), and is thus included. State 
level amendments to IDA that fit our classification have taken place in 11 states 
out  of  those  shown  in  Table  2  (most  Union  Territories  and  smallest  states 
excluded). West Bengal is a clear outlier case, where amendments that suit our 
categorisation took place frequently in the 1980s.  
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Andhra Pradesh  2.5  3.1  0.6 
Assam  0  0  0 
Bihar  0  0  0 
Chandigarh  0  0  0 
Delhi  0  0  0 
Goa  0  0  0 
Gujarat  0  2  1 
Haryana  0  0  0 
Himachal Pradesh  0  0  0 
Karnataka  1.1  0.6  -0.6 
Kerala  1  0  -2 
Madhya Pradesh  0.9  0  -0.9 
Maharashtra  0  0.9  3.5 
Orissa  0  0.05  1.6 
Punjab  0  0  0 
Rajasthan  1.8  2.5  -1.0 
Tamil Nadu  4.0  0  -1.7 
Uttar Pradesh  0  -0.8  0 
West Bengal  2.1  9.3  15.6 
Main source for legal indicators: Manual on Labour and Industrial Laws, Commercial Law Publishers (India) 
Pvt. Ltd. The variables in this table include changes since 1947, but are averaged over 1979-1999, which is the 
period for which data on the court indicators is available. Negative values for the Besley and Burgess indicator 
refer to pro-employer orientation. The values for the Besley-Burgess indicator used here are those shown in the 
published paper (2004). 
 
There  is  a  positive,  albeit  not  a  strong  correlation  between  pro-worker 
amendments to IDA and the share of pro-worker awards (Table 3). A strongly 
significant  positive  relationship  between  the  two  cannot  be  confirmed  by  a 
state-level fixed effects model with year dummies, but a significant relationship 




As pointed out also by Besley and Burgess (2004) and others, the occurrence of 
strikes and lockouts, or mandays lost to strikes and lockouts, should also reveal 
something about the industrial relations climate in each state, although these 
figures  do  exhibit  considerable  variation  from  year  to  year.  Table  1  shows 
figures on mandays lost to strikes and lockouts (in private and public industries) 
that fall under state jurisdiction in each state (scaled by total number of workers 
in  registered/organised  factories
15).  Interestingly,  the  correlation  between  the 


















Court efficiency  1         
Pro-worker share  -0.01  1       
Mandays lost per 
worker (state)  -0.11  0.10  1     
IDA           
Enforcement act  0.13  0.17  0.05  1   
Pro-worker act  0.18  0.12  0.03  0.50  1 
The correlations between pro-worker acts, enforcement acts and mandays lost are calculated for a larger sample, 
as data on the practical legal indicators has missing observations. 
 
To  relate  our  indicators  to  perceptions  in  practice,  the  state  of  Gujarat,  a 
relatively industrial state, has a reputation as being tough on labour (see e.g. 
Hasan et al., 2007), whereas Kerala is considered a state where workers have a 
voice. This perception is not supported by the data on pro-worker amendments 
to the IDA (also a feature of the Besley and Burgess categorisation). However, 
Gujarat has a slightly lower average value for the share of pro-worker court 
awards and a clearly lower one for mandays lost to strikes and lockouts. It also 
has  a  lower  value  for  court  efficiency,  which  could  signal  that  the  dispute 
process is less relevant or the level of enforcement lower. These suggest that if 
common perceptions are reasonable, the practical indicators may give a more 
precise  picture  of  practice  than  the  statutory  ones.  On  the  other  hand,  as 
explained above, there is some correlation between IDA amendments and the 




This Section describes the general hypotheses associated with each of the legal 
indicators. Since the study uses several datasets to study different channels of 
effect, more specific hypotheses are presented when the empirical approaches 
and datasets are described.  
 
The central hypothesis of this paper is that the variation between states, and 
over  time,  in  dispute  settlement  and  labour  regulation  affects  the  degree  of 
formal  work.  This  may  occur  via  changes  in  firms’  hiring  patterns  and 
productive and expansion plans, either via perception or anticipation. Reactions 
to judicial trends can occur with a time lag. The indicators on statutory change 
and judicial change in practice should be considered as complementary and to 
simplify matters, the hypotheses the same for both. However, it is possible that 
the significance of the two differs if for instance “law on the books” is not 




The share of pro-worker awards out of total awards (pro-worker share) is used 
as an indicator of judicial orientation in practice. Pro-worker judicial change 
can  lead  to  a  higher  threshold  for  a  firm  to  hire  a  permanent  rather  than  a 
temporary worker
17. It could discourage small firm expansion, if it impedes the 
adjustment of labour input or the closing down of a firm. Such change may also 
raise the incentive for a worker to attempt to take a dispute to court.  
 
A potential problem associated with this measure is that the outcome will also 
reflect the nature of the case, which is difficult to control for. However, if the 
industry of employment is controlled for in the forthcoming regressions, it may 
be that the nature of cases does not differ greatly between states. Thus, we 
require the assumption that cases tend to be on average of equal nature in each 




If state level variation in the efficiency of the dispute settlement process exists, 
we would expect to see differences in the degree of unresolved court cases. The 
relationships between formal work and efficient labour courts and legal change 
aiming to improve the quality of dispute settlement are a priori unclear. A high 
degree of unresolved cases can be a sign of irrelevance of the dispute settlement 
mechanism without much association with formal work. On the other it could 
also be considered a nuisance factor disrupting the conduct of business that 
discourages the expansion of formal work. If the legal system is perceived as 
inefficient, workers and employers might even be discouraged from taking or 
attempting to take legal action, be satisfied with a conciliation outcome, or even 
abstain from raising the dispute in the first place. Amendments that strengthen 
and facilitate the dispute settlement process could then lower the threshold for 
workers to force disputes into abjudication. However, such change would also 
simultaneously facilitate the process for the employer. Again, the assumptions 
made above about the nature of the cases may be required here as well. 
 
Enforcement and pro-worker acts (IDA amendments)  
 
The hypotheses for pro-worker amendments are the same as for the pro-worker 
court awards above. As above, the predictions on the effects of enforcement 
amendments are not a priori clear-cut. The relevance of statutory change may 
depend on the degree of enforcement in practice, which will be tested with the  
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use of an interaction term between the variables “pro-worker acts” and “court 
efficiency”.  
 
Evidently, efficient processes are likely to be associated with the level of state 
development in general, which the regression model will control for, but may 
also derive from political changes and attitudes for reform. Controlling for state 
political orientation is likely to be problematic. There are data limitations, but 
the  main  reason  is  that  political  orientation  can  be  a  partial  explanation  for 
variation in pro-worker judicial orientation or efficiency of dispute settlement, 
given the role played by the state in the mediation of disputes.  
 
One concern that relates perhaps more to some of the judicial indicators than 
others is the possibility of reverse causality. Could pro-worker legal change or a 
higher  share  of  pro-worker  court  outcomes  reflect  the  growing  power  of 
workers in a state? Legislative change could potentially be more frequent and 
outcomes more pro-worker when the size of the formal sector grows. On the 
other hand, a valid counter-argument along the same lines would be that a rise 
in formal employment is potentially associated with a rise in firm size and thus 
firm  power.  Considering  that  states  did  not  amend  the  IDA  (or  many  other 
labour acts) at all at all in the 1990s, and that the process of enactment is slow, 
the concern may be unwarranted. Finding a set of instrumental variables for the 
set of judicial indicators is challenging. The paper nevertheless takes a careful 
stance  and  discusses  relationships  and  associations  rather  than  causality 
between the judicial indicators and outcomes of interest. The estimated models 
will  control  for  the  total  number  of  disputes  in  addition  to  the  judicial 
indicators. This can reflect the size of the formal sector, but its inclusion also 
controls for sudden fluctuations in the proneness for disputes, that do not relate 
to a conscious shift in court efficiency or pro-worker bias. 
 
4 LABOUR REGULATION AND REGULAR EMPLOYMENT  
 
4.1 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON INDIAN WORKERS 
 
This first part of the empirical analysis examines the relation between regular, 
salaried  employment  and  the  judicial  process.  The  datasets  on  employment 
structure  used  in  this  study  are  four  cross-sectional  household  employment 
surveys  conducted  by  the  National  Sample  Survey  Organisation  (NSSO). 
Comprehensive employment and unemployment surveys are carried out every 
five years and the ones used here, dictated by electronic access are those for the 
rounds 1983, 1987/88, 1993/94 and 1999/2000. The surveys are cross-sectional, 
so it is not possible to match households or individuals in consecutive surveys.  
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Individuals  can  be  identified  as  employed  on  the  basis  of  their  principal  or 
subsidiary usual activity status. The survey data are based on stratified sampling 
at the level of Indian districts, villages and household types. Within the strata, 
households  are  selected  randomly.  Population  weights  (multipliers)  for 
households for obtaining nationally representative figures are included.  
 
Workers,  who  are  largely  unprotected  by  law  in  India  range  from  paid,  or 
unpaid, self-employed workers to small firm employers. The degree of general 
protection varies by firm size, but even contract workers in organised sector 
firms  may  not  be  offered  a  similar  level  of  social  protection  as  permanent 
workers. Therefore, a relatively strict way of classifying workers into formal or 
informal  would  be  to  distinguish  those  workers  who  are  permanent  in  an 
organised  sector  establishment  from  those  who  work  for  such  as  contract 
workers, or those who work solely for an unorganised establishment, or are self-
employed.  
 
However, prior to the NSSO employment survey of 1999/2000 (55
th Round), 
the information on the type and size of establishment a person is employed in is 
not included. In all of the four cross-sectional employment datasets, those who 
can be considered as employed according to their principal usual activity status 
over  the  year,  are  classified  as  self-employed,  casual  workers  and  regular, 
salaried workers. These are mutually exclusive categories for principal activity. 
Self-employed are either unpaid household workers or own-account workers, 
and since 1993/94 a sub-category of employers for self-employed has also been 
added.  
 
Most casual workers and self-employed are likely to fit our definition of an 
informal worker for the purposes of this paper (unless they are employers with 
large firms), since they are mainly uncovered by standard social security and 
job security provisions and many of the rights that can be disputed do not apply 
to them. This is certainly the case for self-employed, but casual workers are also 
very  unlikely  to  be  covered  for  instance  by  IDA  job  security  provisions 
(Chapter V-B). 
 
There is some variation, but the distribution of workers by nature of work in 
industry or services overall (or in the economy as a whole) has not changed 
considerably  over  the  period  1983-1999.  Table  4  shows  the  shares  of  those 
employed in different forms of employment in all activities, and separately for 
industry and services. Only those individuals whose principal activity over the 
past  year  was  some  form  of  employment  are  included.  The  share  of  casual 
workers on aggregate has risen slightly between 1983 and 1999. The share of  
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self-employed  has  declined  slightly  and  that  of  regular  workers  increased 
slightly in industry if we compare the figures for 1983 and 1999. On the other 
hand,  the  share  of  regular  workers  has  fallen  somewhat  in  services.  The 
relatively small changes between 1983-1999 reinforce the perception that the 
formal-informal divide persists.
18 Survey design has not changed considerably 
for the four rounds, and employment data should be comparable over time (see 
e.g.  Thorat,  2004  for  a  similar  argument).  However,  population  multipliers 
(frequency  weights)  have  been  used  in  calculating  the  shares  in  Table  4  to 
improve comparability.  
 
TABLE 4 EMPLOYMENT TYPE WHEN PRINCIPAL STATUS IS EMPLOYED (age 18-65),  
% shares 
  1983  1987  1993  1999 
All workers         
Self-employed (own-account)  53.4  53.0  51.2  49.5 
Regular, salaried workers  16.0         15.9  15.5         15.9 
Casual workers  30.6        31.1        33.3        34.6  
Total in sample  195,578    212,439  185,394  193,758    
Industry          
Self-employed (own-account)  33.9  38.6  27.3  30.7 
Employer      2.2  1.1 
Unpaid worker in household enterprise  10.3  7.1  11.1  12.4 
Total self-employed  44.2  45.6  40.6  44.2 
Regular, salaried worker  34.5  33.2  36.9  35.7 
Casual worker  21.3  21.2  22.5  20.1 
Total in sample  25,459  26,874  22,644  24,561 
Services         
Self-employed (own-account)  35.7  36.3  35.5  34.5 
Employer      1.8  0.8 
Unpaid worker in household enterprise  6.0  4.4  6.8  7.0 
Total self-employed  41.7  40.7  44.1  42.2 
Regular, salaried worker  42.7  39.0  38.3  36.8 
Casual worker  15.6  20.3  17.6  21.0 
Total in sample  55,064  65,550  63,696  73,411 
Population multipliers (weights) are applied. Industry = Manufacturing, mining and water and electricity (3-
digit  NIC-98  categories  100-410).  Services  include  construction,  wholesale  and  retail  trade,  hotels  and 
restaurants, transports, storage and communications, financial intermediation, real estate, education, health and 
other community and social services (3-digit NIC-98 categories 451 and above). Only those whose principal 
status is employment are considered. Including those who report employment as a subsidiary status would lead 
to some change in the shares of workers included in each employment category, but the development over time 
between different categories would be similar.  
 
In the 1999/2000 survey 10 percent of all individuals aged between 18 and 65 
are  involved  in  regular  wage-employment  and  30  percent  are  self-employed 
either as own account workers, employers or unpaid household workers (see 
Table 5).
19 Almost 70 percent of all non-agricultural workers work in small 
proprietary or partnership firms (see Table 6). Only 7 percent of those who 
report employment as their principal status work in what can be considered as 
private  organised  or  registered  sector  units  (public  limited  companies,  co-
operative  societies,  private  limited  companies  or  other  registered  units  with  
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above 10 employees) and 14 percent in the public or semi-public sector. 42 
percent of all regular, salaried workers in non-agricultural activities, who report 
the number of workers in their workplace, work in a unit with less than 10 
workers.  Thus,  in  strict  terms  not  every  regular,  salaried  worker  can  be 
considered formal for our purposes, since not all of them will be covered by a 
majority of the labour acts. Most self-employed work in small units with less 
than 10 employees, and can be considered informal workers. 
 




Weighted  Un-weighted 
Self-employed  18.8  19.5 
Employer  0.6  0.7 
Unpaid household worker  10.4  10.3 
Regular, salaried worker  9.6  12.0 
Casual (public works) worker  0.1  0.2 
Casual (other) worker  20.7  14.6 
Total  60.2  57.3 
Not employed     
Seeking work  1.6  2.0 
Attended educational institution  3.7  5.1 
Domestic duties only  19.5  21.2 
Domestic duties and free collection  
of goods and work for household use 
 
10.9  10.3 
Pensioners, remittance recipients etc.  0.8  0.9 
Disabled  0.7  0.7 
Beggars, prostitutes   0.1  0.05 
Others  2.5  2.6 
Total  39.8  42.7 
Total  406,047,979  358,304 





















TABLE 6 TYPE OF ENTERPRISE FOR NON-AGRICULTURAL WORKERS, 1999-2000 




Proprietary, male  59.2 
Proprietary, female  5.4 
Partnership, household members  2.1 
Partnership, with other households  1.5 
Public sector  12.1 
Semi-public  1.4 
Public limited companies, co-
operative societies, private limited 
companies, other ASI units  7.2 
Not known    11.1 
Sample total  104,396 
The data is weighted by population weights. Figures are based on principal, usual activity status. ASI = Annual 
Survey of Industries. Industry = Manufacturing, mining and water and electricity (3-digit NIC-98 categories 
100-410). Services include construction, wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, transports, storage 
and communications, financial intermediation, real estate, education, health and other community and social 
services (3-digit NIC-98 categories 451 and above). 
 
4.2 FORMAL WORK AND INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS  
 
Before  moving  on  to  a  joint  analysis  of  the  four  repeated  cross-sectional 
datasets  (Section  4.3),  the  1999/2000  round  is  used  briefly  to  gain  some 
understanding of the correlates or determinants of an organised sector worker. 
These are compared with those of regular, salaried workers, since the latter are 
used to proxy for organised workers in the panel data analysis in Section 4.3. 
The  previous  rounds  do  not  have  information  on  the  type  of  firms  or 
establishments that workers are employed in. The 1999/2000 round includes 
596,686 individuals.
20 The state-level judicial or other indicators are not yet 
included  in  these  regressions,  since  the  analysis  is  cross-sectional  and  the 
interest is in comparing the determinants of regular and organised workers and 
the role of individual attributes. 
 
Following the discussion above, organised or formal workers are defined as 
those with a permanent and regular, salaried job in either a public, semi-public 
or other than an own-account and small firm. The last category includes co-
operative  societies,  public  limited  companies,  private  limited  companies  and 
other  registered  units  covered  under  the  Annual  Survey  of  Industries  (ASI). 
This  is  not  a  precise  definition  of  someone  covered  by  IDA  or  labour 
legislation, since for instance the limits for some IDA provisions and social 
security legislation (such as the Employee’s Provident Fund Act) vary by firm 
size. However, it will be used as an approximate definition to categorise both 
industrial and service-sector workers as either organised or unorganised (see 
Sakthivel and Joddar, 2006 for an alternative categorisation based on the 1999- 
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2000 NSSO sample survey). Table 7 shows the distribution of the labour force 
according to our chosen definition. 
 










Industry unorganised  
(Iu) 
9.9% 
Agriculture (A) 50.9% 
 Seeking work (U) 3.6% 
Labour force = those with principal status “employed” or “seeking work” between the age of 18-65. Population 
weights applied. Organised = regular, salaried workers with permanent employment in either a public, semi-
public or other than an own-account and small firm. 
 
Probit  models  are  estimated  to  compare  the  determinants  of  organised  as 
opposed  to  unorganised  workers  and  regular,  salaried  workers  as  opposed 
irregular (self-employed and casual) workers. A multinomial logit model would 
be  a  more  sophisticated  option
21,  but  for  simplicity  a  binary  classification 
between formal and informal workers is preferred. The model takes the form: 
 




h i Io P ε φ + + + + = = ind s ind s D D γ X β X D D X  
 
where  Io  (or  alternatively  So)  is  a  binary  variable  for  whether  or  not  the 
individual is an organised industrial (or service Soi) sector worker, i refers to the 
individual,  Xi  represents  characteristics  of  the  individual,  Xh  those  of  the 
household (h) of the individual, and Dind refers to a set of industry dummies (at 
2-digit National Industrial Classification NIC-98 level) and Ds to a set of state 
dummies.  The  sample  is  restricted  either  to  industrial  workers  or  service 
workers depending on the dependent variable. Separate models are estimated 
for services and industry.  
 
Table  8  shows  the  descriptive  statistics  for  the  largest  sample  used  in  the 
regressions. All individuals for whom relevant data is available and who work 
in  either  services  or  industry  are  included.  The  sample  is  restricted  to 
individuals between the age of 18 and 65. The sample is weighted by population 
household  multipliers  (frequency  weights)  provided.
22  The  individual 
characteristics  controlled  for  include  age,  a  gender  dummy  variable  (male), 
dummy variables for the general level of education achieved, a dummy variable 
for married persons and a dummy variable for whether the person moved to the 
current location from another enumeration area within the last year. Mobility  
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could be a sign of wealth and choice, or equally the opposite, but could in 
principle affect employment type. 
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TABLE  8  SUMMARY  STATISTICS:  WORKERS  IN  INDUSTRY  AND  SERVICES,  AGE  18-65, 
1999/2000 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Industrial workers (N = 24,537) 
(NIC-98: 100-410)         
    Organised*  0.15  0.36  0  1 
    Regular  0.37  0.48  0  1 
Service workers (N = 72,408) 
(NIC 98: 451 and above)         
    Organised**  0.25  0.43  0  1 
    Regular  0.39  0.49  0  1 
Individual characteristics (N = 96,945)         
Age  36.2  11.3  18  65 
Married  0.77  0.42  0  1 
Male  0.84  0.37  0  1 
Moved (during past year)  0.03  0.17  0  1 
Illiterate  0.19  0.40  0  1 
Literate (without schooling)  0.09  0.29  0  1 
Primary school  0.12  0.32  0  1 
Middle school  0.17  0.38  0  1 
Secondary school (lower and higher)  0.26  0.44  0  1 
Higher degree (graduate and above)  0.16  0.37  0  1 
Household characteristics (hh)         
Urban residence  0.64  0.48  0  1 
Male head  0.93  0.26  0  1 
Land possessed (hectares)  32.4  183.1  0  16288 
Landless  0.23  0.42  0  1 
No. of children (below age 18) in household  1.1  1.03  0  8 
Scheduled tribe  0.07  0.26  0  1 
Scheduled caste  0.15  0.35  0  1 
Other backward class (OBC)  0.32  0.47  0  1 
Hindu  0.76  0.43  0  1 
Muslim  0.15  0.36  0  1 
Christian  0.05  0.22  0  1 
Sikh  0.02  0.14  0  1 
Jain  0.01  0.08  0  1 
Buddhist  0.01  0.09  0  1 
Other religion  0.01  0.08  0  1 
* Data missing for 2602 individuals 
** Data missing for 9543 individuals  
 
The sample is weighted by household multipliers and includes all individual between the age of 18-65 working 
in industry or services, for whom data is available. All individual and household characteristics except for age, 
land possessed and number of children are binary dummy variables. “Landless” is a dummy variable for no 
possession of land and the variable “moved” is a dummy for whether the person had moved to the enumeration 
area from elsewhere over the past year. The dummy variable “married” takes a value of 1 when the person is 
currently married and a 0 when the person has never been married, or is divorced or widowed. There are less 
observations for the variable “organised” worker than regular worker, because of missing observations for the 
variable describing whether employment is of a temporary or permanent nature. There are very few missing 




The household characteristics are the number of children (under age 18) in the 
household,  religion  dummies,  dummy  variables  for  lower  caste  status 
(scheduled caste, scheduled tribe and other backward classes), the gender of the 
household head (dummy for male head) and the amount of total land possessed 
(hectares) by the household. Lower caste status is expected to be associated 
with  lower  welfare  levels  and  opportunities.  Assets  held  could  also  affect 
employment status, which is why the amount of land possessed is included. A 
dummy for urban households is also included. 
 
Table 9 shows the results of Probit models (1) for the probability of being an 
organised worker or a regular worker either in industry or services. Organised 
workers  are  likely  to  be  older,  more  educated  (the  group  illiterate  is  the 
baseline), male, have less children in the household and reside in urban areas. 
Those with a higher degree are 24 percentage points more likely to work in the 
organised industrial or service sector than illiterate individuals.  
 
Lower  caste  status  is  not  necessarily  associated  with  a  lower  tendency  for 
organised work with the exception of the other backward classes. It is possible 
that  this  somehow  reflects  job  reservations  for  lower  caste  members  in  the 
public  sector,  but  could  also  reflect  unobservable  characteristics.  Hindus  in 
general are 3-4 percentage points more likely and Christians 5-9 percentage 
points more likely to be organised sector workers than Muslims (the control 
group). Since this is a cross-sectional dataset, it is possible that some of the 
personal and household characteristics reflect other unobserved factors that are 
potentially better controlled for with a fixed effects panel data model in Section 
4.3. The degree to which the differences arise from choice evidently cannot be 
ascertained here. 
 
The  category  of  regular  workers  is  more  heterogeneous  than  our  defined 
category of organised workers. The results do reflect this to some extent, but the 
coefficients on a majority of the individual characteristics have similar signs as 
in  the  model  for  organised  workers.  This  and  the  facts  that  social  and 
educational factors are important determinants of regular or organised work are 
the messages to derive from this cross-sectional analysis.  
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TABLE 9 PROBIT MODELS FOR ORGANISED WORKER STATUS, 1999/2000 
(marginal effects) 
  Industry  Services 
Variable  Organised 
Regular, 
salaried  Organised 
Regular,  
salaried 
Individual         
Age  0.002**  0.000**  0.005**  0.001** 
Male  0.030**  0.152**  0.002**  0.021** 
Married  0.025**  0.015**  0.030**  -0.043** 
Moved   0.013**  0.077**  0.035**  0.087** 
Literate (no schooling)  0.009**  0.053**  0.046**  0.100** 
Primary school  0.021**  0.084**  0.083**  0.150** 
Middle school  0.059**  0.140**  0.103**  0.205** 
Secondary school  0.116**  0.197**  0.181**  0.271** 
Higher degree  0.243**  0.258**  0.238**  0.243** 
Household         
Urban  0.029**  0.134**  0.012**  0.093** 
Male head  0.005**  -0.051**  -0.035**  -0.023** 
Ln(Land possessed)  0.000**  0.002**  -0.002**  0.001** 
Landless dummy  0.013**  0.133**  -0.003**  0.069** 
No. of children  -0.005**  -0.022**  -0.008**  -0.011** 
Hindu  0.035**  0.111**  0.026**  0.037** 
Christian  0.087**  0.119**  0.053**  0.094** 
Sikh  0.066**  0.009**  -0.013**  0.067** 
Jain  -0.024**  -0.154**  -0.029**  -0.167** 
Buddhist  0.077**  0.086**  0.005**  -0.081** 
Other religion  0.068**  0.063**  -0.001*  0.035** 
Scheduled tribe  0.003**  -0.035**  0.035**  -0.004** 
Scheduled caste  -0.006**  -0.058**  0.016**  -0.043** 
Other backward class (OBC)  -0.006**  -0.054**  -0.009**  -0.022** 
Pseudo R-squared  0.39  0.30  0.56  0.45 
Obs.  21,935  24,537  62,873  72,418 
*, ** = significant at the 95 and 99% levels respectively   
All models include state dummies and industry dummies at the two-digit NIC-98 level. Standard errors are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. A logarithmic form of land possessed is used, with a zero in place of no land, 
which is controlled for with the dummy variable “landless”. Excluded education category is “illiterate” and 





4.3 ANALYSIS WITH PANEL OF REPEATED CROSS-SECTIONS  
 
The  choice  of  employment  and  hiring  practices  can  depend  on  various 
unobserved individual, employer, or location, specific characteristics that are 
not necessarily easy to measure and control for. To introduce a time element 
and a way to control for the unobserved factors that potentially correlate with 
the judicial indicators, a panel dataset is constructed from the cross-sectional 
datasets  based  on  the  average  values  of  variables  for  defined  groups.  This 
technique  is  commonly  used  in  situations,  where  repeated  cross-sectional 
micro-level data are available for a new representative sample each time. This is 
a common scenario in developing countries, where household level panel data is 
rarely  available,  but  repeated  cross-sections  are.  This  Section  describes  this 
modelling approach, the data and the results. Annex 2 describes the features of 
the modelling approach in more detail and possible shortcomings. 
 
In order to incorporate a panel dimension, individuals between the age of 20-49 
in the 1983 survey are divided into six groups, each spanning five years. In the 
next cross-section (1987), the individuals of interest are aged between 24-53. 
These  six  cohorts  are  further  divided  by  state  of  residence,  education  (four 
groups,  see  Table  10)
23  and  gender.  A  group  in  this  study  thus  consists  of 
individuals born within the same 5-year period, who live in the same state and 
have  the  same  level  of  education  and  same  gender.  These  groups  form  the 
fixed-effect  unit.  Individuals  in  each  group  are  assumed  to  share  common 
unobserved characteristics that differ from those of other groups.
24  
 
The main modelling assumption is that given a representative sample, group 
averages  will  be  unbiased  and  the  fixed,  unobserved  characteristics  of  each 
group  remain  unchanged  across  cross-sections  (see  Annex  2  for  details).  A 
potential  problem  with  grouping  individuals  by  state  is  that  the  underlying 
population in the state is likely to change and therefore the group size in the 
sample would change. The state dimension is required for linking the judicial 
indicators to the data. However, mobility between Indian states appears to be 
low.  The  1999/2000  sample  reveals  that  2  percent  of  the  population  falling 
within the age cohorts of this study had migrated from one state to another in 
the last 16 years. 
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TABLE 10 SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR EMPLOYMENT PANEL DATASET (group data) 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Manufacturing worker   3135  0.08  0.07  0  0.48 
Service worker   3135  0.22  0.20  0  0.95 
Agricultural worker  3135  0.32  0.26  0  0.89 
Regular, salaried manufacturing worker  3135  0.03  0.05  0  0.47 
Regular, salaried service worker  3135  0.12  0.16  0  0.78 
Casual worker   3135  0.04  0.05  0  0.65 
Self-employed   3135  0.11  0.10  0  0.67 
Not employed  3135  0.38  0.36  0  1 
Other group characteristics           
Age  3135  41.3  10.5  21.3  64.5 
Illiterate  3135  0.27  0.44  0  1 
Literate without primary education  3135  0.23  0.42  0  1 
Primary or middle school education  3135  0.26  0.44  0  1 
Secondary school or above  3135  0.25  0.43  0  1 
Male  3135  0.52  0.50  0  1 
Married  3135  0.87  0.14  0.03  1 
Urban  3135  0.36  0.25  0  1 
No. of children in household  3135  2.24  0.91  0.20  5.36 
Male head  3135  0.93  0.08  0.52  1 
Land possessed (ha)  3135  57.5  58.7  0.13  564.8 
Scheduled tribe  3135  0.06  0.08  0  0.46 
Scheduled caste  3135  0.14  0.11  0  0.59 
Hindu  3135  0.82  0.15  0.16  1 
Muslim  3135  0.10  0.11  0  0.81 
Christian  3135  0.03  0.07  0  0.56 
Sikh  3135  0.04  0.14  0  0.80 
Jain  3135  0.01  0.02  0  0.28 
Buddhist  3135  0.00  0.01  0  0.15 
Other religion  3135  0.00  0.01  0  0.09 
Labour regulation and other state indicators           
Enforcement acts  3135  0.85  1.35  0  5.0 
Pro-worker acts  3135  1.15  2.56  -1.0  11.0 
Total disputes (3-year mean)  2290  3884  3391  86  12590 
Court efficiency (3-year mean)  2110  0.73  0.74  0  4.7 
Pro-worker share (3-year mean)  2105  0.60  0.17  0  0.9 
Real GDP per capita (1993 prices)  3135  8708  4350  2300  29961 
Population per commercial Banks (000s)  3135  13.8  4.5  4.0  30.0 
Individuals in group  3135  215.6  238.4  20.0  2303 
Household multipliers used as weights (rounded to nearest whole number). The states included in the original sample were 
Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chandigarh, Delhi, Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya 
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. Goa includes Daman and 
Diu up to the year 1988. Sufficient data on the court process indicators, or state-level indicators, is missing for Andhra 
Pradesh, Chandigarh, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. The smallest states and territories are excluded as 
they do not have Labour Courts and have very few dispute cases. Population for 1983 and 1987 are those from 1981 and 
1991 Censuses respectively and for 1993 and 1999 from 2001 Census. A few industries are not included when the variables 
for shares working in each 2-digit (NIC-87) industry are defined. This is due to conversion problems resulting from several 
changes in the industry codes over the time period. The data on commercial banks is for years 1983, 1988, 1993 and 2000.  
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Once groups with less than 20 individuals and the smallest states are excluded, 
we  have  a  maximum  of  870  fixed  effects  groups  based  on  years  of  birth, 
education, gender and state observed over a 16-year period (4 cross-sections). 
Groups with less than 20 individuals are excluded on the basis that they are 
unlikely to be representative. A large share of these observations belongs to 
smaller states or Union territories, which will in any case be excluded from the 
analysis due to unavailability or irrelevance of legal data. In terms of the final 
selection of sample and states, 15 percent of observations are lost due to the 
presence of less than 20 individuals per group. The average group size in the 
final sample is 220 individuals and it varies between the minimum of 20 and the 
maximum  of  2303.  The  basic  sample  for  which  the  group  averages  are 
identified and regressions run includes every individual falling into the group, 
regardless of whether he or she works or not. The panel is unbalanced, since the 
labour regulation indicators or a few other indicators may be missing for a few 
states, or groups, for a few years.  
 
The main hypothesis tested is that the judicial indicators affect the share of 
regular workers in industry and services. In the absence of precise figures on the 
shares of organised workers over time, regular, salaried workers are used as an 
approximation of formal workers. Self-employed and casual workers are thus 
considered informal.  
 
The estimated model with group (g) fixed effects is  
 
(2)   ,...,T t ,...,G;   g α y gt t t gt g gt 1   1 ,
'
st
' = = + + + + + = ε S D γ Z β x  
 
where  gt y   is  the  share  of  the  group  with  regular,  salaried  employment  in 
industry or services,  gt X is a vector of group-specific variables (averaged across 
the group), Zst  a vector of state-specific judicial and other variables, αg is the 
group-specific fixed effect, Dt refers to a set of year dummies and St to state-
specific trends. As explained, some sections of IDA and some other labour acts 
do  not  apply  to  many  service  sector  activities,  but  service  sector  work  is 
nevertheless  analysed  separately  with  the  same  hypotheses  as  for  industrial 
sector work. The explanatory variables are defined as in the cross-sectional 
study,  but  in  this  case  represent  group-averages.  This  means  that  group 
characteristics represent fractions of the group with a certain characteristic.
25 
The standard errors are corrected for state-level clustering. 
 
The models control for the general level of employment by including the share 
of individuals in the group who are without work. They also include indicators 
for  the  shares  working  in  agriculture  and  either  in  services  or  industry  
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depending  on  the  dependent  variable,  and  indicators  for  the  shares  of 
individuals  working  for  a  certain  two-digit  (NIC-98)  industry/service  sector. 
The latter control for industry-specific factors, which are otherwise difficult to 
incorporate  into  such  a  panel  data  framework,  such  as  the  impact  of  trade 
liberalisation  on  industrial  composition.  They  proved  to  be  statistically 
significant. State-specific trends capture unobserved, state-specific changes over 
time.  Given  the  short  time  dimension,  the  latter  might  remove  important 
variation  attributed  to  other  variables,  but  the  significance  of  the  control 
variables is not much affected by the inclusion of these trends.  
 
Group-specific  control  variables  are  lower  caste  status  (indicator  for  either 
scheduled  tribe  or  caste),  marital  status,  number  of  children,  male  head  of 
household,  urban  dummy  and  amount  of  land  possessed.  It  is  important  to 
control for age, since the average age of the individuals in the groups examined 
rises  over  the  16-year  period  and  is  thus  likely  to  affect  the  nature  of 
employment.  Only  certain  groups  of  individuals  are  tracked  and  thus  the 
average age in the sample is higher in the latter years.
26 
 
A  few  state  level  indicators  are  included  to  capture  the  general  level  of 
development  and  together  with  the  state-specific  trends,  reduce  potential 
omitted variable bias on the state-level judicial variables. These include state 




The state-level judicial indicators included are the cumulative IDA indicators, 
court efficiency, pro-worker share, and the total number of disputes that enter 
the  industrial  relations  machinery  (IRM).  Additionally,  an  interaction  term 
between the pro-worker IDA amendments and the court efficiency indicator is 
included  in  one  specification  to  test  if  the  significance  of  pro-worker 
amendments varies by the degree of judicial efficiency. Since all actual state-
level amendments to IDA were made in the 1980s, there is no change in the 
IDA indicators between 1993 and 1999.  
 
The indicators of the court process in practice enter the regressions as three-year 
means (averages over the current and past two years) of the indicators for the 
court process.
28 This raises the number of observations that can be used and 
mitigates possible outlier effects. Logarithmic form for court efficiency and the 
total number of disputes is used to further mitigate the effect of outliers, which 
are more remarkable for these than the variable for pro-worker share. We might 
be concerned that a larger absolute number of total disputes could result from a 
higher degree of formality and not vice versa and result in a bias. However, as  
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mentioned  it  may  be  important  to  control  for  general  fluctuations  in  the 
proneness to disputes, which may not reflect any conscious effort to alter the 
court process. Due to some outlier values in the number of abjudicated cases, 
the total number of disputes raised is used instead. This is merely a control 
variable throughout.  
 
Seven  models  are  estimated  for  both  industry  and  services.  The  difference 
between the models relates to the set of judicial variables included. Firstly, four 
models that include one judicial indicator at a time are estimated. These are 
followed by three models that include the variables for court efficiency and pro-
worker court outcomes and either one of the indicators for IDA amendments. 
Due  to  a  relatively  high  degree  of  correlation,  the  two  indicators  for  IDA 
amendments are not included in the same model. The final model includes an 
interaction  term  between  pro-worker  acts  and  the  court  efficiency  indicator 
instead  of  either  one  of  the  IDA  amendment  variables.  Sample  size  varies 
depending on the indicators included. 
 
Table  10  shows  descriptive  statistics  for  the  largest  sample  used  in  the 
regression  analysis.  The  values  in  each  survey  are  weighted  using  given 
household multipliers.  
 
Table 11 shows the results for the share of regular, industrial workers and Table 
12 those for regular, service-sector workers. As in the cross-sectional model 
(Table 9) urban residence and hindu religion are associated with a higher share 
of regular, industrial workers. With one exception, the judicial indicators are 
insignificant  in  the  case  of  regular,  industrial  workers.  The  exception  is  the 
negative coefficient for enforcement IDA acts. One enforcement amendment is 
associated with a 0.2 percentage point fall in the share of regular industrial 
workers.  However,  the  variable  is  not  significant  in  Model  6,  which  also 
includes other judicial indicators. The interaction term between pro-worker acts 
and court efficiency in insignificant. 
 
In  the  case  of  services  (Table  12),  the  group-characteristics  are  not  highly 
significant. Enforcement amendments are not statistically significant, but pro-
worker  amendments  have  a  significantly  negative  coefficient  in  one  model 
specification, which also includes the court process indicators. One pro-worker 
amendment is associated with a 0.7 percentage point lower share of regular 
workers. However, pro-worker amendments are not significant when included 
in  a  model  without  the  court  process  indicators.  Thus,  the  evidence  for  a 
negative relationship between pro-worker or enforcement IDA amendments and 
the share of regular, service sector work is weak. Additionally, the share of pro- 
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worker  awards  has  a  significantly  positive  relationship  with  regular,  service 
sector work. A 10 percentage point rise is related to a 0.2-0.3 percentage point 
rise in the share of regular workers.
29 
 
To conclude, the evidence for a negative relation between regular employment 
and enforcement amendments is weak, and such a relationship does not hold for 
court efficiency, which is the indicator for enforcement in practice. The relation 
between  pro-worker  orientation  and  regular  employment  is  even  more 
ambiguous. The coefficient on the share of pro-worker awards is significantly 
positive in several specifications for regular, service sector work. That on pro-
worker IDA amendments is negative for regular, service sector work, but only 
weakly so and in one specification that includes the other judicial indicators as 
well. Additionally, the coefficients for the IDA indicators become insignificant 
if one period lags of the IDA indicators are used (not shown). Thus, the analysis 
does  not  lead  to  robust  conclusions,  and  the  relationship  between  judicial 
change and the irregular-regular employment divide does not appear to be a 
clear-cut one.  
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TABLE 11 SHARE OF GROUP WORKING AS REGULAR, SALARIED INDUSTRIAL  
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Age  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003] 
Age^2  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Married  0.006  0.006  0.002  0.001  0.002  0.002  0.002 
  [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006] 
No. of children  0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
Ln(Land possessed)  0.004  0.004  0.005  0.005  0.005  0.005  0.005 
  [0.001]**  [0.001]**  [0.001]**  [0.001]**  [0.002]**  [0.002]**  [0.002]** 
Male head  0.019  0.019  0.021  0.022  0.022  0.021  0.021 
  [0.017]  [0.017]  [0.022]  [0.020]  [0.022]  [0.022]  [0.022] 
Not working  -0.294  -0.294  -0.327  -0.332  -0.327  -0.326  -0.326 
  [0.053]**  [0.053]**  [0.074]**  [0.073]**  [0.074]**  [0.074]**  [0.074]** 
Service worker  -0.282  -0.282  -0.315  -0.321  -0.315  -0.315  -0.314 
  [0.051]**  [0.051]**  [0.070]**  [0.069]**  [0.071]**  [0.071]**  [0.070]** 
Agricultural worker  -0.279  -0.279  -0.306  -0.308  -0.306  -0.305  -0.305 
  [0.054]**  [0.054]**  [0.078]**  [0.076]**  [0.078]**  [0.078]**  [0.078]** 
Urban  0.022  0.022  0.028  0.027  0.028  0.029  0.028 
  [0.008]**  [0.008]**  [0.010]*  [0.010]*  [0.010]*  [0.010]**  [0.010]* 
Hindu  0.027  0.027  0.034  0.036  0.034  0.034  0.035 
  [0.012]*  [0.012]*  [0.020]x  [0.019]x  [0.020]  [0.020]  [0.020]x 
Christian  0.041  0.041  0.048  0.050  0.049  0.048  0.049 
  [0.015]*  [0.015]*  [0.028]  [0.027]x  [0.028]  [0.028]  [0.028] 
Scheduled tribe  -0.001  -0.001  0.013  0.001  0.014  0.015  0.013 
  [0.015]  [0.015]  [0.023]  [0.028]  [0.023]  [0.022]  [0.022] 
Scheduled caste  -0.010  -0.010  -0.012  -0.010  -0.012  -0.012  -0.012 
  [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.012]  [0.011]  [0.012]  [0.012]  [0.012] 
Labour regulation               
Pro-worker acts   -0.001        -0.002     
  [0.001]        [0.003]     
Enforcement acts     -0.002        -0.005   
    [0.001]*        [0.004]   
Ln(Court efficiency)       0.002    0.002  0.003  0.002 
(mean)      [0.002]    [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
Pro-worker share         0.000  -0.002  -0.004  -0.004 
(mean)        [0.016]  [0.015]  [0.014]  [0.015] 
Ln(Total disputes)      -0.002  -0.000  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002 
(mean)      [0.003]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.005]  [0.004] 
Ln(Court efficiency)*              0.002 
Pro-worker acts               [0.002] 
State controls               
Ln(GDP per capita)  -0.014  -0.015  0.013  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.014 
  [0.007]x  [0.006]*  [0.025]  [0.024]  [0.030]  [0.023]  [0.027] 
Population/banks  -0.000  -0.000  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.001]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.001]  [0.002] 
Constant  -1.328  -1.466  -0.542  -0.745  -1.319  -1.307  -0.338 
  [3.287]  [3.257]  [5.590]  [5.653]  [5.700]  [5.449]  [5.615] 
Observations  3135  3135  2016  2057  2016  2016  2016 
Number of groups  844  844  710  710  710  710  710 
R-squared (within)  0.68  0.68  0.69  0.68  0.69  0.69  0.69 
x = significant at 90%; ** significant at 95%; *** significant at 99%. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation and clustering by state. All regressions include group fixed effects. Groups are based on year of birth, gender, education and 
state. All models include state-specific trends and separate variables on the shares working in each industry (at the 2-digit NIC-level). 
Dummies for all religion categories are included, but to conserve space, only those with a statistically significant coefficient are shown. 
Excluded education dummy is “illiterate” and excluded religion dummy “Muslim”. The variables “pro-worker share” and “court efficiency” 
are 3-year averages. The data for each survey sample has been weighted by available population multipliers.  
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TABLE 12 SHARE OF GROUP WORKING AS REGULAR, SALARIED WORKERS IN SERVICES 
Group characteristics  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Age  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001 
  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003] 
Age^2  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Married  -0.013  -0.013  -0.019  -0.018  -0.020  -0.019  -0.019 
  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.011]x  [0.011]  [0.011]x  [0.011]  [0.011]x 
No. of children  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
Ln(Land possessed)  0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.001  -0.000  -0.001 
  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003] 
Male head  0.008  0.008  0.008  0.010  0.009  0.008  0.009 
  [0.012]  [0.012]  [0.012]  [0.011]  [0.013]  [0.012]  [0.012] 
Not working  -0.193  -0.192  -0.251  -0.250  -0.247  -0.249  -0.247 
  [0.116]  [0.116]  [0.188]  [0.189]  [0.192]  [0.189]  [0.190] 
Manufacturing worker  -0.169  -0.168  -0.207  -0.205  -0.200  -0.203  -0.201 
  [0.101]  [0.101]  [0.171]  [0.172]  [0.173]  [0.172]  [0.172] 
Agricultural worker  -0.177  -0.176  -0.230  -0.231  -0.226  -0.229  -0.227 
  [0.123]  [0.123]  [0.197]  [0.198]  [0.200]  [0.198]  [0.199] 
Urban  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.003  0.003  0.002  0.002 
  [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.012]  [0.012]  [0.012]  [0.012]  [0.012] 
Hindu  0.044  0.044  0.069  0.070  0.068  0.068  0.068 
  [0.027]  [0.027]  [0.037]x  [0.038]x  [0.037]x  [0.037]x  [0.037]x 
Christian  0.056  0.056  0.083  0.083  0.084  0.082  0.081 
  [0.035]  [0.035]  [0.048]  [0.045]x  [0.046]x  [0.046]x  [0.047] 
Buddhist  0.151  0.151  0.190  0.138  0.181  0.173  0.176 
  [0.047]**  [0.047]**  [0.061]**  [0.050]*  [0.060]**  [0.059]*  [0.060]* 
Scheduled tribe  0.023  0.023  -0.006  0.002  -0.003  -0.002  -0.003 
  [0.017]  [0.017]  [0.023]  [0.022]  [0.024]  [0.023]  [0.024] 
Scheduled caste  -0.014  -0.015  -0.012  -0.016  -0.011  -0.011  -0.011 
  [0.019]  [0.019]  [0.024]  [0.027]  [0.024]  [0.024]  [0.023] 
Labour regulation               
Pro-worker acts   -0.001        -0.007     
  [0.000]        [0.004]x     
Enforcement acts     -0.001        -0.003   
    [0.001]        [0.005]   
Ln(Court efficiency)       -0.002    -0.001  -0.002  -0.001 
(mean)      [0.002]    [0.001]  [0.002]  [0.001] 
Pro-worker share         0.023  0.025  0.022  0.024 
(mean)        [0.013]x  [0.013]x  [0.014]  [0.014] 
Ln(Total disputes)      -0.001  0.005  0.005  0.004  0.004 
(mean)      [0.004]  [0.002]*  [0.003]  [0.002]x  [0.002] 
Ln(Court efficiency)*              -0.002 
Pro-worker acts               [0.002] 
State controls               
Ln(GDP per capita)  -0.003  -0.003  -0.030  0.010  -0.029  -0.006  -0.006 
  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.031]  [0.025]  [0.037]  [0.020]  [0.028] 
Population/banks  0.000  -0.000  0.002  0.003  0.004  0.003  0.004 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]*  [0.003]  [0.003] 
Constant  -1.753  -1.854  -3.242  -2.037  -5.646  -3.826  -3.537 
  [4.354]  [4.367]  [6.374]  [5.320]  [7.162]  [6.196]  [5.800] 
Observations  3135  3135  2016  2057  2016  2016  2016 
Number of groups  844  844  710  710  710  710  710 
R-squared (within)  0.93  0.93  0.91  0.92  0.92  0.91  0.91 
Notes as above in Table 11.  
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In an attempt to shed more light on pro-worker change, further models with 
varying  outcomes  of  interest  were  estimated.  Models  with  pro-worker 
amendments as the only judicial indicator are presented in the first row of Table 
13  (Model  1).  Pro-worker  amendments  have  no  relation  with  the  share  of 
industrial, service or agricultural workers, or with the share of self-employed in 
the entire industrial or service sector. However, they are associated significantly 
positively  with  the  share  in  casual  work  in  the  entire  industrial  and  service 
sectors combined. Again, the results on casual employment and self-employed 
are  sensitive  to  whether  current  of  lagged  IDA  indicators are  included.  The 
same models, where the pro-worker IDA indicator is replaced with enforcement 
IDA  indicator  show  no  relation  between  enforcement  amendments  and  the 
different outcomes (Model 2 of Table 13). If instead of the IDA amendments, 
the indicators on the court process in practice are included, the only significant 
relation is a negative one between the share of pro-worker awards and self-




TABLE 13 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: JUDICIAL CHANGE AND EMPLOYMENT TYPE 







Industry  Services  Agriculture 
Model 1           
Pro-worker acts  0.002  -0.000  0.004  -0.000  -0.003 
  [0.001]*  [0.001]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
Model 2           
Enforcement acts  0.003  0.001  0.003  -0.000  -0.003 
  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.003]  [0.002] 
Obs.  3135  3135  3135  3135  3135 
Model 3           
Pro-worker share (mean)  0.004  -0.052  -0.041  -0.079  0.034 
  [0.024]  [0.020]*  [0.029]  [0.091]  [0.023] 
Ln(Court efficiency)  -0.001  0.001  -0.001  -0.006  0.002 
(mean)  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.004]  [0.002] 
Ln(Total disputes) (mean)  0.004  -0.013  -0.021  -0.029  0.019 
  [0.005]  [0.004]**  [0.008]*  [0.016]x  [0.007]* 
Obs.  2016  2016  2016  2016  2016 
R-squared (within)  0.59  0.66  0.32  0.64  0.71 
Notes  as  above  in  Table  11.  The  only  legal  indicator  in  Model  1  is  “pro-worker  acts”  and  in  Model  2 
“enforcement acts”. Model 3 refers to models that include the court process, but not the IDA indicators. The 
explanatory variables are the same as in Tables 11 and 12. All regressions control for the share of the group not 
working. The models “Casual” and “Self-employed” include the variables for the shares of the group working in 
each sector (2-digit NIC). The models “Industry” and “Agriculture” control for the share working in services 
and the model “Services” for the share working in industry. All regressions include group fixed effects.  
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Thus, the relationships remain ambiguous with indicators on statutory change 
and the court process in practice pointing at times at different directions. The 
results on the IDA indicators are somewhat sensitive to specification. However, 
one  might  argue  that  given  the  short  panel  dimension,  the  inconclusiveness 
could  be  attributed  for  instance  to  a  lack  of  time  variation.  An  alternative 
analysis with a panel data set constructed by pooling the four cross-sectional 
surveys together was also estimated. Logit models for regular versus irregular 
work were estimated separately for industrial and service workers, either with a 
sample restricted to such workers, or all working-aged individuals. The interest 
here  was  in  cross-sectional  variation,  but  there  is  arguably  more  scope  for 
omitted variable bias, although state-specific dummy variables were included. 
Additionally,  the  interpretation  for  cumulative  IDA  amendments  is  cross-
sectional,  whereas  the  primary  aim  of  this  paper  was  to  concentrate  on  the 
changes to IDA. The results of this exercise are not presented, but the judicial 
variables  were  hardly  more  statistically  significant  than  in  the  panel  data 
analysis.  Additionally,  similar  problems  with  sensitivity  to  specification  and 
indicator remained. Final conclusions on the relationship between the judicial 




5  LABOUR  LAW  AND  THE  LINKS  BETWEEN  ORGANISED  AND 
UNORGANISED SECTORS  
 
This Section analyses briefly the relationship between the judicial indicators 
and two outcomes: social security contributions by organised sector employers 
and the tendency of unorganised firms to produce for a contractor, which is 
often  a  larger,  organised  firm.  In  both  cases,  the  focus  is  on  industry  or 
manufacturing, mainly due to data availability. Social security coverage in the 
organised manufacturing sector is used as a proxy for the degree to which such 
firms rely on casual or contractual workers within an industry. The first part 
involves  the  use  of  a  standard  industry-state  level  panel  dataset  (5.1).  The 
second  part  relies  on  a  cross-sectional  survey  of  unorganised  sector 
manufacturing units (5.2).  
 
5.1 LABOUR REGULATION AND SOCIAL SECURITY IN 
ORGANISED MANUFACTURING 
 
The organised, manufacturing sector data used in the analysis come from the 
Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). According to the Ministry of Statistics and 
Programme Implementation, the Annual Survey of Industries “is the principal  
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source  of  industrial  statistics  in  India.  It  provides  statistical  information…of 
organised manufacturing sector comprising activities related to manufacturing 
processes, repair services, gas and water supply and cold storage. It covers all 
factories registered under Sections 2m(i) and 2m(ii) of the Factories Act, 1948 
i.e.  those  factories  employing  10  or  more  workers  using  power;  and  those 
employing 20 or more workers without using power”.
30  
 
The ASI data are available at different levels of precision, and the dataset used 
here  is  an  annual  panel  dataset,  where  the  unit  of  observation  is  a  3-digit 
industry  (NIC-87)  at  the  state-level  for  the  years  1980-1997.  The  electronic 
version  of  the  data  does  not  include  actual  figures  separately  for  contract 
workers and permanent workers. At this degree of precision, such figures are 
electronically available only from the year 1999. Thus, it is argued here that 
within-industry changes in employer’s social security contributions as a ratio of 
the total wage bill can function as a proxy indicator for the share of permanent 
as opposed to contract workers in an organised sector manufacturing industry.  
 
Social  security  arrangements  such  as  the  Employees’  Provident  Fund  and 
Employees’  State  Insurance  schemes  cover  establishments  that  employ 
respectively  above  20  or  10  workers.  Provident  fund  payments  on  both  the 
employer’s and employee’s part are directly proportional to the wages of the 
employee  (currently  at  12%  for  the  employer).
31  The  principal  employer 
(employer  in  our  data)  is  responsible  for  paying  both  the  employer’s 
contribution  and  the  employee’s  contribution  also  in  the  case  of  workers 
employed through a contractor. However, these payments are then to be claimed 
from  the  contractor  (see  Contract  Labour  (Regulation  and  Abolition)  Act, 
1970). Social and other facilities are also primarily the responsibility of the 
contractor. As mentioned earlier, contract workers are generally not protected 
by the job security provisions in IDA. Survey evidence by Rajeev (2006) shows 
that  the  provisions  in  the  Contract  Labour  Act  are  often  violated,  contract 
workers are often excluded from the Provident Fund and other social benefits 
that they would be entitled to and collusion between official inspectors and 
employers is common. Although contract workers should legally be entitled to 
similar wages than equivalent permanent workers, survey evidence also reveals 
that wages for contract workers in organised firms are lower than those for 
permanent workers after controlling for worker-specific characteristics, and can 
be below the minimum wage (Bhandari and Heshmati, 2006).  
 
The NSSO 1999/2000 household survey data used above also support the claim 
that it is uncommon for other than permanent organised sector workers to be 
covered  by  the  Provident  Fund  (see  Table  14).  This suggests  that,  although  
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official records of organised firms should cover provident fund for all workers, 
workers on contract may not be covered. This evidence supports the use of 
employers’ social contributions as a share of the wage bill as a proxy for the 
share of permanent as opposed to contract or casual workers in organised sector 
firms. The indicator used may not be indicative of between industry differences, 
but since the estimated models include industry fixed-effects, it is the within-
industry change that is of main interest.   
 
TABLE 14 PROVIDENT FUND COVERAGE FOR NON-AGRICULTURAL WORKERS  
  All industry and 
services 
Public, semi-public and ASI firm 
workers 












Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent 
Yes  22.4  90.4  11.7  74.7  3.1 
No  74.0  9.3  85.5  24.8  94.0 
Missing  3.6  0.3  2.8  0.5  2.9 
Total obs.  104,359  19,147  4,284  28,839  37,034 
Data source: NSSO 55
th Round Household Employment and Unemployment Survey (1999-2000). Worker is 
anyone whose principal status involves a form of employment. ASI firm includes co-operative societies, public 
limited companies, private limited companies and other units covered under Annual Survey of Industries. 
 
Further support can be obtained from ASI data for 1999-2002 (state-industry 
level),  for  which  the  exact  number  of  contract  workers  is  available.  The 
regression results in Table 15 below show that the ratio of all other workers to 
contract workers can be explained by the ratio of employer’s social security 
contributions  to  total  wages  (emoluments),  controlling  for  industry  (3-digit 
NIC-98) and state dummies. The higher is the share of permanent, or other than 
contract  workers,  the  higher  is  the  ratio.  The  data  on  the  social  security 
payments includes old age benefits, provident fund and other funds and welfare 
expenses. Due to changes in the reporting of employer’s social contributions 
over the period examined, provident fund payments alone cannot be examined. 
Even if a fraction of contract workers lawfully receive their share of provident 
fund, other social benefits and their payments are likely to be lower for the 
principal employer, the higher the degree of temporary, contract workers, since 
these can be partly the responsibility of the contractor. The payment of wages is 









TABLE 15 CONTRACT WORKERS AND EMPLOYER’S SOCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS, 1999-2002 
  OLS  Fixed effects (state-
industry) 




Ln(Employer’s social contributions/Total wages and   0.599  0.409 
salaries)  (0.066)**  (0.080)** 
Constant  -3.677  -2.828 
  (0.323)**  (0.156)** 
Observations  3417  3417 
Number of state x NIC    1085 
R-squared  0.30  0.05 
Year dummies  YES  YES 
State and industry dummies  YES  NO 
** = significant at 99% level. Data source: Annual Survey of Industries 1999/00-2002/03 (State x 3-digit NIC-
98). Standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, are shown in parentheses. “Other 
workers” refers to all other employees than contract workers. Observations with an outlier value above 100 for 
the dependent variable (top 5% percent) are excluded. Otherwise all available observations are used. 
 
Industrial  Tribunals  have  jurisdiction  also  over  Provident  Fund  matters  and 
bonus  and  leave  payments.  Therefore,  it  is  possible  that  employers’  social 
contributions  are  directly  affected  by  judicial  changes.  The  degree  of  social 
protection can itself function as an indicator of formality, and the focus on this 
is thus valid for the purposes of this paper.  
 
If the ratio of social contributions to wages is considered a proxy for the share 
of permanent workers, a basic underlying theoretical framework could be one, 
where the firm chooses the demand for different inputs (types of labour in this 
case) in response to changes in costs. For instance, the ratio of inputs could be 
expressed  as  a  function  of  the  price  and  substitutability  between  different 
inputs.  Changes  in  worker  protection  and  dispute  settlement  process  can  be 
viewed as changes in input costs. These arguments ignore that temporary and 
permanent workers are unlikely may not be perfect substitutes. It is important to 
mention that the permanent versus contract worker distinction applies only to 
production workers, not managerial and administrative ones.  
 
The ASI survey design has changed a few times between in the 1980-2002 
period,  for  which  the  3-digit  state-industry  level  data  are  electronically 
available. This concerns variables and definitions, but also the cut-off points for 
firm size below which only a sample is used to estimate the total number of 
firms and their characteristics. The national industrial classification (NIC) has 
also changed twice during this period. The 3-digit classification for 1970 and 
1987 is more disaggregate than that for the year 1998. For these reasons, the 




The  estimated  model  is  a  state-industry  (3-digit)  fixed  effects  model  of  the 
following form 
 
it t t st ist is ist ist W S ε α + + + + + = S D χ Z β X
' ' ) ln(     (3)  
 
where i refers to industry, s to state and t to time. αis is a state-industry fixed 
effect,  the  dependent  variable  is  the  ratio  of  employer’s  total  social 
contributions (Sist) to the total wage bill (Wist) in each state-industry, Xist refers 
to a vector of state-industry characteristics, Zst to a vector of state characteristics 
including the judicial indicators, Dt to a set of year dummies and St to a set of 
state  specific  trends.  Much  has  been  written  about the  determinants  of  total 
employment levels with ASI data. This paper will refrain from doing so, since 
this alone does not reveal much about the formal-informal divide, which can 
happen  within  the  organised  ASI  sector  and  requires  an  analysis  of  entire 
industrial sector employment. 
 
Table 16 shows summary statistics for the variables for the largest sample used 
in the regression analysis. The models control for a few state-level development 
indicators that might correlate with the judicial variables. For the same reason 
as given in Section 4.3, state development expenditure and capital expenditure 
are excluded, but their inclusion would not change our general conclusion on 
the  judicial  indicators.  All  outlier  values  of  the  dependent  variable  (values 
above 1) are removed and logarithmic form used. The regression models control 
for the share of production workers out of total employees.  
 
The  regression  results  are  shown  in  Table  17.  Different  specifications  with 
different  combinations  of  the  judicial  variables  are  estimated.  Initially,  an 
industry level tariff indicator was included to control for trade liberalisation that 
may have affected hiring practices. However, since changes in such tariffs did 
not have a statistically significant effect, the results of model specifications with 
the variable are excluded, since its inclusion lowers sample size.
33 The model 
specifications in Table 17 include single-year (current) values of the indicators 
on  the  judicial  process  in  practice  (again  logs  for  total  disputes  and  court 
efficiency), and not the three-year means
34. Since we have 18 years of data, this 
approach is more viable as it would have been in Section 4. Once again, due to 
the potential problems caused by a correlation between enforcement and pro-
worker acts, only one of the IDA indicators is included in one model. In this 
case lagged values are used.
35 As in Section 4.3, different models are estimated 




TABLE 16 SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR STATE-INDUSTRY ASI PANEL DATA, 1980-1997 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Industry           
S/W  32577  0.14  0.08  0.0003  0.99 
PW/TW  32577  0.73  0.10  0.01  1.0 
Total employees (TW)  32577  4387.8  13008.1  3.0  315136 
Pay/worker (Rs. 000)  32577  10.71  9.03  0.05  1041.9 
Value of output per worker  
(Rs. ‘000)  32577  186.4  444.4  0.26  23504.1 
Effective tariff rate (%)  14884  101.5  64.7  24.6  434.4 
State level           
Literacy rate  32577  55.1  14.2  30.1  90.9 
Real GDP per capita 
 (Rs. ‘000), 1993 prices  32577  8.7  4.3  2.15  25.6 
Agriculture/GDP  32577  0.47  0.15  0.01  0.72 
Services/GDP  32577  0.31  0.13  0.16  0.85 
Labour regulation           
Pro-worker acts  32577  1.29  2.70  -1  11 
Enforcement acts  32577  0.96  1.46  0  5 
Total disputes  16631  5042.8  3389.8  0  13590 
Court efficiency  15327  0.68  0.53  0  3.21 
Pro-worker share  15758  0.63  0.17  0  1 
The sample is the largest one used in the regressions (Table 17). S = employer’s total social security payment 
contributions, W = total wages of all employees, PW = production workers, TW = total workers and employees. 
The data on tariffs is not available for all industries. Values of output and total wages are deflated by the wholesale 
price index for manufactured products. Literacy rate comes from the Indian Census. A few outlier values are 
removed for “court efficiency” as well as all outlier values above 1 for PW/TW and the dependent variable and 
negative values for output. Due to changes in NIC classification over the periods, a few industries have been 
excluded due to improper match. The states included in the final sample are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Delhi, 
Goa,  Gujarat,  Haryana,  Himachal  Pradesh,  Karnataka,  Kerala,  Madhya  Pradesh,  Maharashtra,  Orissa,  Punjab, 
Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh. Goa includes Daman and Diu up to the year 1988 onwards. Not all of 
these may have data on the court process indicators for each year. 
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TABLE 17 ORGANISED INDUSTRIAL SECTOR (ASI) EMPLOYERS’ SOCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ln (S/W) 
Industry 
characteristics 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
PW/TW  -0.588  -0.587  -0.490  -0.492  -0.492  -0.493  -0.520 
  [0.078]**  [0.078]**  [0.099]**  [0.101]**  [0.101]**  [0.102]**  [0.110]** 
Ln(Pay/worker)  0.005  0.005  -0.074  -0.083  -0.081  -0.083  -0.081 
  [0.029]  [0.029]  [0.039]x  [0.037]*  [0.038]*  [0.037]*  [0.040]x 
Ln(Total employees)  0.082  0.082  0.074  0.071  0.071  0.071  0.068 
  [0.011]**  [0.011]**  [0.017]**  [0.017]**  [0.017]**  [0.017]**  [0.018]** 
Ln(Value of   0.159  0.159  0.169  0.170  0.169  0.170  0.159 
output/worker)  [0.016]**  [0.016]**  [0.018]**  [0.019]**  [0.019]**  [0.019]**  [0.021]** 
Labour regulation               
Pro-worker act (-1)  0.007          0.020   
  [0.003]*          [0.013]   
Enforcement act (-1)    0.021      0.052     
    [0.011]x      [0.017]**     
Pro-worker share      0.040    0.037  0.040  0.043 
      [0.048]    [0.042]  [0.041]  [0.042] 
Ln(Court efficiency)         0.016  0.017  0.014  0.019 
        [0.006]*  [0.005]**  [0.007]x  [0.007]* 
Ln(Total disputes)       0.000  -0.005  -0.000  -0.001  -0.002 
      [0.021]  [0.018]  [0.018]  [0.020]  [0.019] 
Ln(Court efficiency)               -0.009 
*Pro-worker act (-1)              [0.004]x 
State 
characteristics 
             
Literacy rate  0.000  0.000  0.007  0.005  0.004  0.005  0.006 
  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.007]  [0.008]  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.007] 
Ln(Real GDP per   -0.135  -0.140  -0.105  -0.097  -0.060  -0.070  -0.097 
capita)  [0.072]x  [0.073]x  [0.113]  [0.117]  [0.106]  [0.114]  [0.112] 
Agriculture/GDP  0.539  0.512  0.003  -0.003  -0.155  -0.007  0.052 
  [0.171]**  [0.174]**  [0.497]  [0.512]  [0.581]  [0.455]  [0.412] 
Service/GDP  0.740  0.696  0.421  0.478  0.319  0.464  0.497 
  [0.185]**  [0.206]**  [0.494]  [0.475]  [0.540]  [0.419]  [0.368] 
Constant  -52.101  -51.317  -20.209  -19.303  -13.789  -16.442  -17.943 
  [10.762]**  [10.459]**  [19.695]  [19.387]  [16.150]  [18.753]  [18.287] 
Observations  32577  32577  15131  14945  14945  14945  14965 
Number of state x 
NIC 
2581  2581  2221  2192  2192  2192  2193 
R^2  0.22  0.22  0.23  0.23  0.23  0.23  0.21 
x,  *,  **  =  significant  at  90%,  95%,  99%  level  respectively.  S/W  =  Employer’s  social  contributions/total  wages,  PW  = 
production workers, TW = total workers and employees. The standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering (state-
level) and heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. All regressions include state-industry fixed effects. The regressions include 
year dummies and state specific trends. The panel dataset is unbalanced. 42 outlier observations with the dependent variables 
above 1 are excluded. 
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The  results  reveal  that  larger  firms  in  terms  of  employment  and  output  per 
worker have higher employer’s social contributions in relation to the wage bill. 
Firms  with  a  higher  share  of  production  workers  have  a  lower  social 
contribution ratio. The positive coefficients on the share of pro-worker court 
awards are almost, but not quite significant at the 90 percent level. Pro-worker 
IDA amendments have a significantly positive coefficient in one specification. 
One pro-worker IDA amendment is associated with a 0.7 percent higher share 
of social payments to wages. The exception is the weakly significant, negative 
coefficient  on  the  interaction  term  for  pro-worker  amendments  and  court 
efficiency in Model 7. 
  
Court  efficiency  and  enforcement  amendments  have  a  significantly  positive 
relation with social payments in several specifications. A ten percent rise in 
court efficiency can be linked to a 0.1-0.2 percent rise in the social payment to 
wage ratio. An enforcement act is associated with a 2-5 percent rise. Thus, the 
more efficient is the judicial process, the higher the degree of social protection 
offered  to  organised  sector  workers  or  the  higher  the  share  of  permanent 
workers in organised industries. This would offer some support for efforts to 
improve  the  efficiency  of  the  legal  system  and  enforcement.  However,  the 
magnitudes of the relationships are quite small, especially for the court process 
indicator. 
  
If the ratio of employers’ social contributions to wages is a good proxy for the 
ratio  of  permanent  as  opposed  to  contract  workers,  the  hypothesis  that  pro-
worker legal change has been associated with a rise in the degree of contract 
workers in the organised sector is largely not confirmed. Pro-worker change 
may thus not act as a disincentive to recruit permanent workers as suspected. 
This is not entirely implausible. Whereas job security provisions can raise firing 
costs,  the  possibility  of  a  trade-off  exists  if  a  more  stable  employment 
relationship also raises worker productivity (see e.g. Belot et al., 2007 for a 
theoretical  analysis),  which  could  even  raise  the  attractiveness  of  hiring 
permanent workers. 
 
If the focus is simply on social security as a measure of formal employment 
relationships,  the  conclusion  would  be  that  the  degree  of  social  protection 
offered to an average worker in an organised sector firm has risen with pro-
worker  legal  change.  Thus,  pro-worker  judicial  change  may  succeed  in 
protecting at least those workers it directly aims to protect. On the basis of the 
evidence showed, we cannot conclude that pro-worker IDA amendments, or 
improvements in court efficiency and enforcement, would have been associated 
with an informalisation of work within the organised, industrial sector.   
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5.2 LABOUR REGULATION AND SUB-CONTRACTING 
 
This final Section examines the relationships between the judicial indicators and 
the  tendency  of  small,  unorganised  manufacturing  units  to  produce  for 
contractors.  This  often  takes  place  as  a  sub-contracting  arrangement  with  a 
larger, organised sector firm or contractor (see e.g. Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 
2002). Chemin (2004) has examined this behaviour with a recent NSSO survey 
that includes all types of non-agricultural informal firms in relation to contract 
enforcement and High Court efficiency. The motivation here is different and the 
focus on the relation with the quality of industrial dispute settlement and pro-
worker legal orientation. The hypothesis is that organised manufacturing firms 
might evade pro-worker judicial change or increased tendency for disputes by 
sub-contracting some of their production to unorganised units.   
 
The data used come from the 56
th NSSO Round survey dataset of unorganised 
manufacturing  enterprises  for  the  year  2000-01.  It  is  based  on  stratified 
sampling, where the stratification is by urban-rural divide, village and enterprise 
type. The survey covers 152,431 unique firms, both urban and rural. These are 
small firms, not covered by the Annual Survey of Industries (Section 5.1) and 
thus by definition should have less than 20 workers (or no more than 10 if they 
operate with power). In the entire sample 67 percent are small, own-account 
enterprises without hired workers, 22 percent non-directory enterprises (up to 5 
workers, at least one hired) and only 11 percent directory enterprises with 6 or 
more workers. Such surveys have also been carried out in the past (1989/90, 
1994/95),  but  a  further  inspection  revealed  that  comparability  over  time  is 
questionable. Secondly, only the latest survey includes information on working 
for a contractor. In this latest survey, 27 percent of the firms responded that they 
work on a contract basis. The majority of such firms (73 percent) work solely 
for another enterprise or contractor.  
 
The following Probit model for the probability to be engaged in contract work 
(destination of production is a contractor) is estimated  
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where Ci is a binary variable for whether or not the firm works for a contractor, 
Xi represents characteristics of the firm, Zs those of the state in which the firm 
operates,  and  Dind  refers  to  a  set  of  industry  dummies  (at  3-digit  National 
Industrial Classification NIC-98 level). The firm characteristics controlled for 
include  gross  value-added  per  worker,  total  number  of  workers,  a  dummy 
variable for whether the firm is registered with any authority or under a legal act  
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(small share) and another dummy for whether the firm replies that competition 
from larger units is a problem.  
 
Since the dataset is cross-sectional, due to a high degree of correlation between 
certain state variables that resulted in unrealistic coefficients, not all possible 
state-level indicators can be included. Summary statistics for the largest sample 
used in the regression analysis are found in Table 18.
36 As was done with the 
household data, the sample is weighted by “population multipliers” (frequency 
weights) provided. This does not affect the main conclusions on the judicial 
variables.  
 
TABLE 18 SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR UNORGANISED MANUFACTURING FIRMS, 2000/01 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Contract work (dummy)  89805  0.24  0.43  0  1 
Competition from larger units a problem (dummy)  89805  0.14  0.35  0  1 
Registered under an authority (dummy)  89805  0.24  0.43  0  1 
Gross value added per worker (Rs.)  89805  22036  32606  24  2,352,030 
Total workers  89805  2.8  2.6  1  20 
Urban (dummy)  89805  0.62  0.49  0  1 
Labour regulation           
Total disputes (3-year mean)  89805  4868  4290  138  12590 
Court efficiency (3-year mean)  67340  0.69  0.51  0.24  1.96 
Cases pending in state Labour Courts /population in ‘000   89805  0.75  0.79  0.01  2.77 
Pro-worker share (3-year mean)  89805  0.53  0.15  0.25  0.71 
State characteristics           
Literacy rate (%)  89805  69.5  10.3  47.5  90.9 
Population per commercial banks (‘000)  89805  14.2  3.6  5.0  21.0 
Development exp/total expenditure  89805  0.57  0.06  0.44  0.69 
Services/GDP  89805  0.53  0.07  0.41  0.86 
Registered manufacturing (ASI)/GDP  89805  0.11  0.05  0.02  0.25 
Real GDP per capita (Rs. 000)  89805  12.7  4.9  4.2  31.1 
Weighted sample (by population multipliers rounded to the nearest whole number). The sample is the largest one used in 
the regressions (Table 19). There are very few missing values for the variable on competition from larger units, but 
given the nature of the question posed, these values can be treated as values of 0 instead of 1. The sample excludes 
outlier observations, where the value of total workers is above 20 (less than 1% of observations). It also excludes 
negative value for gross value added per worker. Smallest states and union territories are excluded. The last year for 
which the legal indicators were available in the statistical sources used was 1999 and thus the 3-year average is that for 
1997-1999. States that include judicial data and can thus be included are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chandigarh, 
Delhi, Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab and 




Once again, averages of the judicial variables over the past three years are used 
in the regressions. However, the use of a one-year lag for single year values 
would not have alter the results, but would have lowered the numbered of states 
included and thus the sample size. Since data for the number of cases pending in 
state Labour Courts are available for the year 2000, it is used as an alternative 
indicator for “court efficiency” (Model 3). The number of labour courts per 
state  population  was  also  experimented  with,  but  it  dropped  out  due  to  co-
linearity problems. 
 
The  results  shown  in  Table  19  suggest  that  unorganised  firms  engaged  in 
contract work are not more productive, but according to one specification can 
be larger in terms of the number of workers. Contract work arrangements are 
more prevalent among firms not registered under any act or agency. Higher 
court efficiency has a significantly negative relationship with sub-contracting 
arrangements  (Models  1  and  3),  whereas  the  share  of  pro-worker  awards  is 
insignificant (Models 3 and 4). A one percent rise in court efficiency (Models 1 
and 2) is associated with a 0.1 percentage point fall in the probability to work 
for a contractor. The magnitude does not seem very large. 
 
The coefficient on cases pending in Labour Courts is positive and significant in 
Model 2, which corresponds with the result on court efficiency in Models 1 and 
3. A ten percent higher degree of pending cases per population (inefficiency) is 
related to a 0.6 percentage point higher probability to work for a contractor.  
Bearing  in  mind  the  cross-sectional  nature  of  the  data,  court  efficiency  is 
associated with a lower probability for a firm to engage in a sub-contracting 
arrangement.  The  sign  on  the  coefficient  for  the  share  of  pro-worker  court 
awards is sensitive to the inclusion of the court efficiency variable, and the 
coefficient itself is not significant. Sub-contracting to the unorganised sector 




TABLE 19 PROBIT MODEL: PROBABILITY OF UNORGANISED FIRMS TO ENGAGE IN 
CONTRACT WORK (Marginal effects) 
Firm characteristics  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Competition from larger units a   -0.010  -0.018  -0.010  -0.015 
problem  [0.016]  [0.015]  [0.015]  [0.016] 
Registered under an authority  -0.043  -0.068  -0.043  -0.040 
  [0.019]*  [0.018]**  [0.018]*  [0.018]* 
Ln (Gross value added per worker)  -0.009  -0.003  -0.009  -0.006 
  [0.009]  [0.007]  [0.009]  [0.009] 
Ln(Total workers)  0.026  0.036  0.026  0.022 
  [0.017]  [0.016]*  [0.016]  [0.017] 
Urban  0.035  0.037  0.035  0.037 
  [0.032]  [0.024]  [0.032]  [0.034] 
Labour regulation         
Pro-worker share (mean)      -0.026  0.254 
      [0.137]  [0.155] 
Ln(Court efficiency) (mean)  -0.090    -0.094   
  [0.032]**    [0.040]*   
Ln(Cases pending/population)    0.058     
    [0.018]**     
Ln(Total disputes) (mean)  -0.009  -0.014  -0.012  0.029 
  [0.024]  [0.020]  [0.031]  [0.029] 
State characteristics         
Literacy rate  -0.001  0.005  -0.001  0.004 
  [0.002]  [0.002]**  [0.003]  [0.003] 
Population per commercial banks  0.010  0.017  0.008  0.032 
  [0.006]  [0.006]**  [0.013]  [0.017]x 
Development expenditure/total   -0.125  -0.555  -0.119  -0.291 
expenditure  [0.212]  [0.292]x  [0.224]  [0.189] 
Registered  manufacturing/GDP  -0.240  -0.047  -0.221  -0.112 
  [0.644]  [0.576]  [0.679]  [0.562] 
Services/GDP  0.035  0.096  0.028  0.250 
  [0.250]  [0.201]  [0.246]  [0.263] 
Ln(GDP/capita)  0.168  0.054  0.167  0.157 
  [0.083]*  [0.052]  [0.083]*  [0.107] 
Observations  67340  89805  69906  82917 
Pseudo R-squared  0.38  0.39  0.38  0.38 
x, *, ** = significant at 90%, 95% and 99% levels respectively. Models include industry dummies at 3-digit 
NIC-98.  
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering by state.  
 
 
It needs to be acknowledged, that since the results are based on a cross-sectional 
dataset, they can be sensitive to specification and the coefficients may suffer 
from  omitted  variable  bias.  The  latter  is  to  some  extent  mitigated  by  the 





This study has examined the relationships between formal employment and pro-
worker judicial bias and the efficiency of dispute settlement in India. Several 
hypotheses have been presented. Temporary workforce can provide a means to 
circumvent  job  security  provisions  in  IDA  in  organised  establishments.  An 
increased  reliance  on  contract  workers  could  be  considered  as  a  rise  in  the 
degree of informal work within the organised sector. Judicial changes could 
affect the tendency of firms to shift some of their production or sub-contract 
work to smaller units that are not covered by various labour laws, or the dispute 
settlement procedures. More in general, such changes could also affect both 
large and small firm incentives for employment expansion.  
 
The results show that the chosen judicial indicators matter to an extent, but 
significance varies. Even when statistically significant, the magnitude of the 
association  between  formal  employment  and  the  judicial  indicators  remains 
rather small. In some cases, the statutory amendments produce results that differ 
quite  substantially  from  those  of  models  that  include  the  court  process 
indicators. The results on IDA amendments evidently rest on the belief that the 
codification accurately portrays the judicial developments and bias at the state 
level. 
 
The study finds little support for a negative association between pro-worker 
judicial  change  and  regular  versus  irregular  work  in  the  entire  service  or 
industrial sector. The results on the regular versus irregular work divide are not 
robust to specification, or indicator, which implies that a strong relationship 
between  judicial  change  and  an  economy-wide  formal-informal  employment 
divide  cannot  be  confirmed.  In  one  specification,  current  year  pro-worker 
amendments to IDA have a weakly significant, negative relation with regular 
work in the service sector. However, the share of pro-worker court awards is 
insignificant for industry, and has a significantly positive relation with regular 
service sector work. Similarly, although there is some evidence of a negative 
relationship between current year IDA enforcement amendments and regular, 
industrial employment, such a negative relationship does not hold for the court 
efficiency  indicator.  Additionally,  these  results  on  IDA  amendments  are 
sensitive to whether current or lagged values are used.  
 
Some of this inconclusiveness may derive from a lack of variation due to the 
short panel-dimension, or the possibility that regular workers are not a sufficient 
proxy  for  formal  workers  covered  by  labour  laws.  But,  the  results  do  also 
suggest that judicial change in the area of industrial disputes may not alter firm  
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expansion  plans  significantly  enough  to  change  the  formal-informal  worker 
divide. A more pessimistic conclusion would be that models that rely on such 
judicial indicators at a relatively aggregate level are sensitive to specification, or 
indicator, and unlikely to produce reliable results. 
 
However, such a conclusion is likely to be unwarranted. Judicial change, both 
increased  pro-worker  orientation  and  efficiency,  can  be  linked  more 
consistently  to  the  ratio  of  employer’s  social  contributions  to  wages  in  the 
organised  industrial  sector.  In  the  case  of  enforcement  and  efficiency,  the 
practical and statutory indicators point to a similar conclusion. Higher judicial 
efficiency is associated with a higher degree of social payments. Pro-worker 
court awards are not strongly significant, but pro-worker IDA amendments have 
a positive relationship with the degree of social payments. Thus, the degree of 
social protection offered to any worker in an organised sector industrial unit has 
risen with judicial efficiency and pro-worker statutory change.  
 
An  intuitive  explanation  for  the  formalisation  of  work  within  the  organised 
sector is possible. The influence of judicial change is simply clearest in the case 
of sectors and workers directly affected and covered by IDA and other labour 
laws.  Although  efficient  courts  and  pro-worker  judicial  orientation  may  not 
affect the overall regular-irregular worker divide, such developments do protect 
those  workers  who  are  the  primary  target.  If  changes  in  the  ratio  of  social 
payments to wages are interpreted as a proxy for within-industry changes in the 
degree of permanent workers, the results also suggest that pro-worker judicial 
developments, and more efficient courts, cannot be linked to within-industry 
increases in the shares of contract workers. It may even be possible that higher 
costs arising from pro-worker legal change are traded off for a rise in worker 
productivity,  which  might  make  the  hiring  of  permanent  workers  more 
attractive. 
 
Finally,  the  relationship  between  pro-worker  judicial  orientation  and  the 
tendency of unorganised manufacturing units to produce for contractors is also 
an ambiguous one. This can strengthen the conclusion that pro-worker legal 
evolution is unlikely to be a crucial factor behind the persistence in informal 
employment  in  India.  However,  more  efficient  courts  are  associated  with  a 
lower  tendency  of  unorganised  firms  to  engage  in  a  sub-contracting 
arrangement.  This  relationship  can  appear  small  in  size  and  the  conclusion 
relies on a cross-sectional dataset, but as such it suggests that the practice of 
contracting out production in the hope of evading disputes and regulation could 
be lower when courts are more efficient. Although, efficient courts may not be 
linked to a lower formal-informal worker divide overall, they may still enhance  
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the business-environment at some level. This was one of the initial hypotheses 
offered for court efficiency.  
 
The  range  of  results  on  court  efficiency  in  practice  implies  that  efforts  to 
improve the efficiency of dispute settlement could play a role, although a rather 
small  one,  in  raising  formal  employment.  Facilitated  dispute  settlement  is 
already  a  feature  of  Special  Economic  Zones  (SEZs).
37  At  the  local  level, 
informal dispute settlement mechanisms, such as Lok Adalats (peoples’ courts), 
have become an alternative tool for speeding up the dispute settlement process 
(see e.g. Sivananthiran and Ratnam, 2003).  
 
To end with, it is important to note that personal attributes social factors, such 
as education, gender, religion and marital status, are found to be key correlates 
of employment type in a cross-sectional analysis. In terms of policy, they are 
likely to be more important than the legal factors. A general policy suggestion 
for raising the degree formal and regular work supported by the results would 
be to improve educational opportunities, but also to target other inequalities. A 
further  means  of  formalising  the  informal  would  be  to  extend  the  scope  of 
legislation. This is unlikely to suffice without a reformulation of law, which 
would  need  to  be  accompanied  with  a  more  profound  change  in  working 
























1  Government  and  public  enterprises  in  the  areas  of  trade  and  services  are 
generally considered as organised, as are units registered under the Banking 
Companies Act (Bhalla, 2003). In the manufacturing sector unorganised units 
are categorised as own account enterprises (no hired workers), non-directory 
enterprises (five or fewer workers of which at least one is regularly hired) and 
directory enterprises (six or more workers of which at least one is hired). 
2 Prior to this the employment threshold was 300 workers. A lay-off refers to 
temporal unavailability of work, whereas retrenchment is permanent.  
3 Additional support for this is found for instance from Sen (2003) who claims 
that labour regulation has in general not been a constraint on employers, as they 
have circumvented many provisions due to the laxity in state administration and 
enforcement. She points out that in September 1998, a large textile group laid 
off  1200  workers  in  Gujarat  for  34  days  without  asking  for  government 
permission. This was possible via an agreement with the union. 
4 A notice needs to be supplied within six weeks before a strike or a lock-out to 
the  other  party  and  the  appropriate  government  should  receive  immediate 
notice, upon which it can refer the dispute for conciliation or court (Section 22). 
5 However, if the government does not respond to the application within 60 
days, permission is deemed to be granted. 
6 The definition of layoff in the IDA (Section 2kkk) is given as “the failure, 
refusal or inability of an employer on account of shortage of coal, power or raw 
materials or the accumulation of stocks or natural calamity of for any other 
connected reason to give employment to a workman whose name is borne on 
the  muster  rolls  of  his  industrial  establishment  and  who  has  not  been 
retrenched.”  Retrenchment  relates  to  (Section  2oo)  “the  termination  by  the 
employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise 
than  as  a  punishment  inflicted  by  way  of  disciplinary  action”,  but  excludes 
voluntary  retirement,  retirement  on  super-annuation  at  age  specified  in  the 
contract, on the grounds of ill-heath and since 1984 also excludes termination 
on the grounds of non-renewal of contract.   
7 However, court rulings have deemed various service sector activities, such as 
real estate and the supply of water (see Sen and Karnani Properties vs. State of 
West  Bengal,  1990)  as  industrial  activities.  Section  2j  of  IDA  (amended  in 
1982) also specifies a broad range of activities as belonging under the concept 
of “industry”. The main exceptions are agricultural operations, hospitals and 
dispensaries, educational institutions, domestic services, village industries and 
any activity where the number employed is less than ten. In the retail industry,  
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state-specific  Shops  and  Establishments  Acts  apply  to  all  workmen  in  an 
establishment registered under the Act. 
8 Changes to the Contract Labour Act are of potential relevance when assessing 
the degree of contract work in organised firms, but there been very few state-
level amendments to this act during the period examined in this study. 
9 Most disputes are settled at the state level, but the central government is the 
appropriate  government  for  industries  under  the  authority  of  the  Central 
Government, railway companies and certain industries listed in Schedule 2(a) of 
the IDA. 
10 And in Bihar since 1956, but only for units registered under the Shops and 
Establishments Act (see Shenoy in Sivananthiran and Ratnam, 2003). 
11 Some suggested reasons for the delays in the abjudication process are the 
complex step-wise nature of the process, shortage of staff as well as qualified 
presiding officers, duplication of work for conciliation and abjudication, and the 
lack  of  enforcement  mechanism  (see  Shenoy  in  Sivananthiran  and  Ratnam, 
2003).  
12 I consulted the Office of the Chief Labour Commissioner in New Delhi on 
obtaining more detailed state-specific information on industrial disputes, court 
cases and outcomes over time. There appears to be no readily available central 
register, but information would have to be collected manually for each state 
separately, which would be a time-consuming task. 
13 See “Labor Regulations in India Impact and Policy Reform Options”, 
presentation by Ahmad Ahsan to the Human Development Network, New 
Delhi, November 2006. 
14 Results are available on request. 
15 The data for this comes from the Annual Survey of Industries, which covers 
mostly manufacturing establishments.  
16 Data on state level trade union membership is not shown due to a relatively 
large number of missing annual observations. Available figures do demonstrate 
that union density varies by state. 
17 It needs to be acknowledged that job security provisions cannot simply be 
viewed  as  a  cost  from  the  firm’s  perspective.  The  firm’s  desire  to  hire 
temporary workers could also depend on changes in other costs and competitive 
pressure, and perfect substitutability between different types of workers is an 
unrealistic  assumption.  The  degree  to  which  substitutability  is  possible  may 
vary by industry. 
18 The share of adults aged between 18-65 who identified “seeking work” as 
their principal status and who thus fit the traditional definition of unemployed 
has not changed much over the 16 years spanned by the four cross-sections. It  
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was 1.8% in 1983, 2.5% in 1987, 2% in 1993 and 1.9% in 1999. The percentage 
of  workers  with  unknown  industrial  affiliation  is  small  and  similar  in  each 
survey.  
19 Missing data values are not a problem in this area of the survey. 
20 The sampling design differed from that of previous rounds in the sense that a 
set of households was revisited for employment data. For simplicity, the dataset 
used in this study only includes the employment data obtained during the first 
visit 
21 If a multinomial logit model is estimated, the majority of the explanatory 
variables have similar signs and significance as in the probit model. 
22 This does not alter the results dramatically, but the statistical significance of 
some coefficients does change.  
23 Further disaggregation of those whose education is beyond primary schooling 
was not appropriate, since it would have lowered the number of individuals per 
group considerably. 
24 Another option might have been to divide individuals by state and industry of 
association and carry out the analysis on a state-industry basis. However, in 
such a case, the group size is likely to change considerably more from year to 
year, since individuals change industry and workplace more frequently. 
25 Since the dependent variable now represents a share of individuals in each 
group, a new estimation problem is introduced. Since one of the main reasons 
for  constructing  a  panel  is  the  ability  to  control for  some  unobserved  fixed 
characteristics for states and groups, it is important to be able to estimate a fixed 
effects model. Models that are developed for fractional variables such as the 
fractional logit model cannot easily accommodate fixed effects. The choices we 
are  left  with  are  a  standard  fixed  effects  model  and  a  model  where  the 
dependent  variables  is  the  log-odds  transformation,  log[y/(1–y)]  (see  e.g. 
Wooldridge,  2002).  The  latter  is  an  acceptable  procedure,  but  the  boundary 
values of 0 and 1 will be excluded. It is also difficult to estimate the marginal 
effects  and  thus  the  coefficients  do  not  have  a  simple,  direct  interpretation. 
Thus, only standard fixed effects models are estimated. 
26 If it would be the case that wage levels affect the degree of informality, a 
proper measure for the wage levels between organised and unorganised workers 
should be included Many of the unorganised workers do not receive wages in 
the traditional sense and it could be preferable for this measure to be derived 
from  an  outside  source  rather  than  constructed  from  the  household  survey. 
Regressions with state-level minimum wage included were experimented with, 
but the variable was not statistically significant, and its inclusion resulted in co-
linearity with several other state-level variables.  
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27 See e.g.  Burgess and Pande (2005) for a study on the positive effects of 
opening  of  rural  banks  on  poverty  and  non-agricultural  output.  At  first,  the 
share of developmental expenditure in state government total expenditure and 
state government capital expenditure per capita were also included. However, 
since information was missing in the source used for two states for the earlier 
years of the 1980-2000 period, they were excluded to maximise the number of 
states with legal data. The exclusion of these two indicators does not change our 
conclusions about the judicial indicators.  
28 The averages are constructed so that if the information is missing for some 
year, only those years out of three consecutive years are considered for which 
data is available. This makes them approximations. Given the relatively short 
time dimension and the fixed effects analysis, missing values for the combined 
set  of  court  process  indicators  pose  limitations  to  using  single,  current-year 
observations. 
29  This  coefficient  would  be  insignificant  had  state-specific  trends  been 
excluded. 
30See http://www.mospi.nic.in/mospi_asi.htm.    
31 See e.g. http://epfindia.nic.in/ 
32 The results would not change much if the larger sample (1980-2002) would 
be used instead. 
33 The data on tariffs is imperfect and unavailable for all industries. There is no 
easily accessible electronic database on Indian tariffs of sufficient coverage and 
the data source used here did not include tariffs for all industries. Tariff data 
come from Das (2003) and depict the effective rate of protection, available for 
five-year periods between 1980-2000 at the NIC-87 3-digit level. 
34 The use of 3-year averages instead would only strengthen the conclusions on 
the judicial indicators. 
35 The decision to include lagged as opposed to current values of the judicial 
indicators  and  vice  versa  was  decided  simply  on  the  basis  of  statistical 
significance.  Current  values  were  more  significant  than  lagged  for  court 
efficiency and pro-worker share, whereas in the case of IDA amendments, the 
lags were more significant.   
36 Given that not all states have data on the judicial indicators, the final sample 
appears to be somewhat biased towards larger firms. 
37 Units inside SEZs are to be considered as public utility services. See for 
instance http://www.indiainbusiness.nic.in/industry-
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DATA SOURCES FOR STATE LEVEL AND OTHER VARIABLES 
 
Data on disputes, abjudication and union membership: Various issues of Indian 
Labour Statistics, Pocket Book of Labour Statistics and Indian Labour 
Year Book, Labour Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Labour, 
Shimla/Chandigarh. 
State  level  GDP  at  factor  cost  (constant  1993-94  prices),  Industry/GDP, 
Services/GDP:  Reserve  Bank  of  India,  Database  on  Indian  Economy, 
2006. 
State  Population:  Indian  Labour  Yearbook.  Initial  source:  Indian  Census. 
Values for 1981 Census are used for 1980-1985, 1991 values for 1986-
1994 and 2001 values for 1995-2000. 
State Capital expenditure: Reserve Bank of India, Handbook of Statistics on 
State Government Finances.  Deflated by annual average of wholesale 
price index for manufactured products (see below). 
State  Development  expenditure/total  expenditure:  Reserve  Bank  of  India, 
Report on Currency and Finance (for 1980-1990), Reserve Bank of India, 
Online Database on Indian Economy (from 1991). 
State population per commercial banks: Various issues of Report on Currency 
and Finance, Reserve Bank of India, and Report on Trend and Progress 
of Banking in India, Reserve Bank of India. 
Number  of  State  Labour  Courts  and  Industrial  Tribunals  (October  1998): 
Sivananthiran, A. and Ratnam, C.S. (2003). 
Number of cases pending in state Labour Courts (May 2000): Sivananthiran, A. 
and Ratnam, C.S. (2003). 
Annual average of Wholesale price index for manufactured products (base year: 
1981/82): Reserve Bank of India, Database on Indian Economy, 2006. 
Tariff data by industry: Das (2003), the effective rate of protection, available for 




ANNEX  1 All state level amendments to (deviations from) central IDA 1947 classified as “facilitation/enforcement” or “pro-
worker/employer” or both. 
Facilitation and 
Enforcement  Section     
Andhra Pradesh, 1987  2A  Individual workman can apply directly to Labour Court for abjudication of industrial dispute concerning dismissal and alike.  1
Andhra Pradesh, 1987  11  Labour Court or Tribunal has the power of a Civil Court to execute its award as a decree of a Civil Court.  1
Andhra Pradesh, 1987  29A  Maximum period of imprisonment (a penalty) for breach of settlement or award extended to a year from 6 months.  1
Andhra Pradesh, 1987  33C 
Collector for recovering money due from employer (as part of award) is the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the equivalent and 
this money is to be considered as a fine.  1
Karnataka, 1988  10 (4A)  Workman can apply directly to the Labour Court for abjudication of industrial dispute.  1
Karnataka, 1988  11  Conciliation officer can ask for additional documents or testimonies if considered relevant for the dispute.  1
Kerala, 1979  29  Maximum period of imprisonment (a penalty) for breach of settlement or award extended to a year from 6 months.  1
Madhya Pradesh, 1981  11b  Increases power of labour courts in criminal cases.  1
Rajasthan, 1958  10A-J 
State government can refer the dispute to abjudication if referred voluntarily for arbitration, and no arbitrator is appointed, or 
the government is of the opinion that the continuance of the dispute is not in the public interest, and the dispute would not be 
settled by other means. In the Central Act, no possibility of abjudication of disputes if referred for arbitration is mentioned.   1
Rajasthan, 1984  25Q  Extends penalty of imprisonment to 3 months from a month if layoff or retrenchment occurs without permission.  1
Tamil Nadu, 1949  2A 
Any industry can be declared a public utility service - this can speed up the dispute settlement process since dispute will be 
considered from the day that the notice is received. In normal circumstances an application for conciliation/settlement is 
required first.   1
Tamil Nadu, 1949  10 (2A)  Employer or majority of workmen can apply directly for abjudication in a Court or Tribunal.  1
Tamil Nadu, 1982  29  Maximum period of imprisonment (a penalty) for breach of settlement or award extended to a year from 6 months.  1
Tamil Nadu, 1988  11  Conciliation officer can ask for additional documents or testimonies if considered relevant for the dispute.  1
Tamil Nadu, 1988  2ª  Individual workman can apply directly to Labour Court for abjudication of industrial dispute concerning dismissal and alike.  1
West Bengal, 1980  11  Labour Court or Tribunal has the power of a Civil Court to execute its award as a decree of a Civil Court.  1
West Bengal, 1980  12  Amendment provides an opportunity to delay the report of the conciliation officer.  -1
West Bengal, 1980  33C 
Collector for recovering money due from employer (as part of award) is the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the equivalent and 
money is to be considered as a fine.  1
West Bengal, 1986  15  Includes additional detail on the duties of Courts and Tribunals, specifically concerning the determination of interim relief.   1
West Bengal, 1989  10  Individual parties to the dispute can apply for abjudication if conciliation procedure is pending and no settlement is reached.  1
1 = improvement,  
-1 = deterioration       
 
 







Andhra Pradesh, 1987  2A  Individual workman can apply directly to Labour Court for abjudication of industrial dispute concerning dismissal and alike.  1
Andhra Pradesh, 1987  9A  Extends notice period for a change in service conditions of workers to 45 days (from 21 days).  1
Andhra Pradesh, 1987  25fff  Prior payment to workmen is a precondition to closure of an establishment.  1
Andhra Pradesh, 1987  25hh 
When a workman is re-instated by an award, he or she is deemed to be working from the day specified in award (not when 
starts work as in Central Act).  1
Andhra Pradesh, 1987  33C  Collector for recovering money from employer is the Chief Judicial Magistrate and money is to be considered as a fine.  1
Gujarat, 1972  3A  In firms with more than 500 workmen, the State Government can order a Joint Management Council to be constituted.  1
Gujarat, 1972  30  Penalty for employer for not nominating representative to Joint Management Council.  1
Karnataka, 1988  10A  Workman can apply directly to the Labour Court for abjudication of industrial dispute.  1
Karnataka, 1988  11 
Conciliation officer can ask for additional documents or testimonies if considered relevant for the dispute (assumed to be more 
costly to employee than employer)  -1
Karnataka, 1988  25K 
Sections 25O and 25R of Chapter V-B (closing down of undertaking and related penalty) can be applied also to an industrial 
establishment of a seasonal character or where work is performed intermittently (in Central Act these Sections only apply to 
non-seasonal establishments), if the establishment has no less than 100 workers.   1
Maharashtra, 1982  25O 
Any workman affected by the permission to close down an undertaking may within thirty days appeal against the order (not 
possible in central act).  1
Maharashtra, 1986  25K 
Government can apply sections 25R and 25O of Chapter V-B (permission to close down an undertaking and related penalties) 
also to firms with 100 to 300 workers. Redundant, since central amendment in 1984 already makes the sections applicable to 
firms with above 100 workmen.  0
Orissa, 1983  25K 
Threshold for applicability of Chapter V-B (special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain 
establishments) reduced from 300 to 100 workers. Transitional effect, since amendment came into force in central act in 1984.  1
Orissa, 1983  25O  The procedures of closing down an undertaking do not apply to construction work. To be ignored since covers only one sector.  0
Rajasthan, 1980  33C  Collector for recovering money from employer is the Chief Judicial Magistrate and money is to be considered as a fine.  1
Rajasthan, 1984  25K 
Chapter V-B of IDA can apply to (special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments) to 
firms with between 100 and 300 workers. Redundant since substituted by Central Act in 1984.  0
Rajasthan, 1984  25M  Permission for layoff also required for workers in mines (not in Central Act). Ignored since applies only to mines.  0
Rajasthan, 1984  25N  Government needs to hear union on permission to retrench. No mention of union hearing specified in Central Act.  1
Rajasthan, 1984  25Q  Extends penalty of imprisonment to 3 months from a month if layoff or retrenchment without permission.  1
Tamil Nadu, 1988  2A  Individual workman can apply directly to Labour Court for abjudication of an industrial dispute concerning dismissal and alike  1
Tamil Nadu, 1988  11  Conciliation officer can ask for additional documents or testimonies if considered relevant for the dispute.  -1
Uttar Pradesh, 1983  UP IDA 
Threshold of workers for permission of layoff, retrenchment and closure set to 300 workers (deviates from central IDA since 
1984). This is not an amendment to the central IDA, but to a state-specific act. Uttar Pradesh has its own IDA, unlike most 
other states. Bhattacharjea (2006) cites cases where the UP IDA has upheld over the central IDA (which was enacted in 1982, 




West Bengal, 1971  30A  Lowers penalty for closure of establishment without notice.  -1
West Bengal, 1974  2  Restricts the possibility of lay-off.  1
West Bengal, 1980  2 
Ill-health qualifies as a reason for retrenchment for which permission is required. Central act does not recognise termination on 
the grounds of ill-health as retrenchment (for which permission can be required, depending on worker number).   1
West Bengal, 1980  25C  It is no longer possible to retrench a worker after 45 days of lay-off (in central act possible).  1
West Bengal, 1980  25E 
If lay-off lasts for more than 7 days, worker only needs to present himself at work once a week to be entitled to normal 
compensation.   1
West Bengal, 1980  25fff  Prior payment to workmen is a precondition for closure of an establishment.  1
West Bengal, 1980  25hh 
When a workman is re-instated by an award, he or she is deemed to be working from the day specified in award (not when 
starts work as in central act).  1
West Bengal, 1980  25K 
Threshold  for  applicability  of  Chapter  V-B  (special  provisions  relating  to  lay-off,  retrenchment  and  closure  in  certain 
establishments) lowered to 50 workers. Applicable for 4 years as superseded by central IDA amendment that reduced threshold 
from 300 to 100 workers.   1
West Bengal, 1980  25M  Extends period after which employer can lay off a worker despite government not responding to application for permission.  1
West Bengal, 1980  9A  Extends notice period for a change in service conditions of workers to 42 days (from 21).  1
West Bengal, 1986  15  Includes additional detail on the duties of Courts and Tribunals, specifically concerning the determination of interim relief.  1
West Bengal, 1989  2A  Refusal of employment by employer added to definition of an industrial dispute.  1
West Bengal, 1989  25O  Employer needs to provide details and guarantee of the payment of compensation in its application to close down.  1
1 = pro-worker,  
-1 = pro-employer,     
Uttar Pradesh IDA, 1983 refers to an amendment to state-specific legislation, but is considered since it is relevant in this context. Only those amendments that fit the defined 
categories are included. Among others, amendments dealing with qualification of judges and disqualification are not straightforward to classify and are not included. Most of 









ANNEX 2 PANEL DATA FROM REPEATED CROSS-SECTIONS 
 
A  review  of  econometric  methods  for  panels  created  from  repeated  cross-
sections is provided for instance in Verbeek (2006). The modelling approach 
mentioned is not unproblematic. The seminal paper on the estimation of fixed 
effects  models  based  on  repeated  cross-sections  is  by  Deaton  (1985).  He 
proposes to group individuals (or the units observed) who share certain fixed 
characteristics, such as year of birth, into cohorts, and use cohort-averages as 
observations  over  time.  He  shows  that  it  is  possible  to  derive  consistent 
estimators in a fixed effects model. With cohort averages, the estimated model 
will be: 
 
T t C c u y A ct ct ct ,..., 1 ;   ,..., 1        ) 1 ( ,
'
ct = = + + = α β X  
 
where  ct y is the average value of all observations in cohort c in period t,  ct X a 
vector of cohort specific variables (averaged across cohort) and  ct α the cohort-
specific  fixed  effect.  Besides  the  concerns  with  changes  brought  about  by 
mortality and migration of individuals, which change the underlying sample, the 
general problem with estimating a fixed effects panel data model of the type 
(A1)  from  a  series  of  repeated  cross-sections  is  that  the  fixed  effect  is  not 
constant over time. This arises because the individuals change from sample to 
sample and is especially of concern when the sample size per fixed effect group 
is small. The problem arising from the fact that  ct α depends on time diminishes 
with the size of the cohort. If the cohort averages are calculated for a large 
number of individuals,  ct α can be treated as a fixed parameter αc and the within 
estimator for β is likely to be consistent.  
 
If the number of individuals per cohort is not large, Deaton proposes to treat the 
estimation strategy as one, where the variables are measured with error. This 
assumes that the observed cohort averages are error-ridden estimators of the 
true averages, and their variance can be estimated from the underlying micro-
level sample. The asymptotic assumption required is that the number of cohorts 
tends to infinity with more or less constant cohort size. Moffitt (1993) proposes 
an instrumental variable based approach and Verbeek and Nijman (1993) show 
that Deaton’s estimator continues to be inconsistent when the time dimension is 
short. Many previous studies have not implemented the estimator corrections, 
but relied on the cohort size being large enough. This is the case for instance in 
Blundell, Browning and Meghir (1994) with an  average cohort size of 500. 
However,  Devereux  (2004)  argues  that  for  the  bias  to  vanish,  much  larger 
cohort sizes (2000 or more) are required.   
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Although, the suggested estimator corrections involve imperfections, they can 
be implemented for linear models. The issue becomes more complicated with 
binary choice models, which this paper deals with. Although, some possibilities 
have  been  suggested  (see  e.g.  Collado,  1998),  they  are  relatively  complex, 
which  reduces  the  attractiveness  and  possibly  relative  gain.  Therefore,  this 
paper relies on the relatively large number of individuals per cohort to produce 
reasonable estimates and the suggested corrections are not implemented.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 